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INTRODUCTION

In April 1990, the United States ignited a "firestorm of diplomatic
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criticism" by orchestrating the abduction of Dr. Humberto AlvarezMachain, a Mexican citizen, from his office in Guadalajara, Mexico.'
Upon his arrival in Texas, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
officials arrested Alvarez-Machain on charges associated with the 1985
kidnapping and slaying of DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in
Mexico.2 Counsel for Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that the United States lacked jurisdiction because
his abduction violated the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. 3 Although
the district court4 and the Ninth Circuit5 found a clear violation of the
treaty, the Supreme Court reversed. Noting that no specific provision in
the treaty explicitly prohibited extraterritorial law enforcement
operations, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded
that the United States necessarily retained this sovereign right. AlvarezMachain's abduction may have been "shocking and ... in violation of
general international law principles," but the Court nevertheless
downplayed customary international law's relevance to the task of
treaty construction. 6 "[T]he practice of nations under customary
international law," Justice Rehnquist wrote, is "of little aid in construing
the terms of an extradition treaty or the authority of a court to later try
an individual who has been so abducted." 7
I. David 0 . Stewart, The Price of Vengeance: U.S. Feels Heat for Ruling that Permits
Government Kidnapping, 78 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (Nov. 1992); United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 u.s. 655, 657 (1992).
2. !d.
3. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Extradition
Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]).
4. !d.
5. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
6. !d. at 669-70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668 n. l5 . Upon remand, the district court ultimately
dismissed the charges against Alvarez-Machain, finding the government's evidence insufficient.
Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent 's Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20, cited
in Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law ofNations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 42 (1994).
In 2001 , the Ninth Circuit concluded that the kidnapping indeed violated Alvarez-Machain' s
customary international rights to freedom of movement, to remain in his own country, and to
enjoy security in his person, as well as customary prohibitions against arbitrary detention.
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050-52 (9th Cir. 2001), reh 'g granted,
Alvarez-Machain v. [Order] United States, 284 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). The customary
prohibition against acts of force by one sovereign State within another's territory finds expression
in numerous international agreements and treatises. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4
(obligating "all members" to "refrain .. . from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State .. .."); Charter of the Organization of American
States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires,
Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S .T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S. 324; I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 128
n.l, at 295 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (" It is .. .a breach oflnternational Law for a State to
send its agents to the territory of another State to apprehend persons accused of having committed
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Although Alvarez-Machain has inspired substantial academic
literature, 8 surprisingly little attention has been paid to the decision's
broader implications for U.S. courts' interpretation of international
agreements. Alvarez-Machain is remarkable not only for the Supreme
Court's sweeping repudiation of the customary norm against
extraterritorial abductions, but more generally for its failure to recognize
or employ customary international canons of treaty construction. In
construing the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, neither the majority nor
the dissent makes even passing reference to the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), 9 a multilateral treaty prepared
by the United Nations that codifies the customary international canons
governing international agreements. 10 This oversight is particularly
striking given that the Convention directly addresses two critical issues
that divided the majority and dissent in Alvarez-Machain : ( 1) the
relevance of customary international norms in treaty interpretation, and
(2) the degree of deference that courts should render to extra-textual
materials. Had all nine justices employed the Vienna Convention's
directive to interpret the Extradition Treaty in conformity with all
"relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties," 11 the rationale advanced in Justice Blackrnun's dissent
likely would have prevailed. 12
Notwithstanding the
Vienna Convention's internationally
authoritative status, the Supreme Court has never applied the
a crime"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE fOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
432 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("A state ' s law enforcement officers may exercise their
functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly
authorized officials of that state").
8. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After AlvarezMachain, 45 STAN . L. REV. 939 (1993); Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A
Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM . J. INT'L L. 746 (1992); Jordan J. Paust,
After Alvarez-Machain: Abduction, Standing, Denials ofJustice, and Unaddressed Human Rights
Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551 (1993); Andrew L. Strauss, A Global Paradigm Shattered:
The Jurisdictional Nihilism of the Supreme Court 's Abduction Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 67
TEMP. L. REV. 1209 (1994).
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 , reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
10. A separate convention governs the interpretation of agreements between States and
international organizations and agreements between international organizations . Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between
International Organizations, Mar. 21,1986, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.I29/15, reprinted in
25 ILM 543 (1986).
II. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c).
12. See Alvarez- Machain, 504 U.S. at 678-81 (1992) (Stevens, J., Blackmun, J., and
O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that treaty partners cannot idly be presumed to abrogate the
law of nations).
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Convention as U.S. law. In fact, since its entry into force in 1980, only
two Supreme Court opinions have cited the Vienna Convention-one a
majority opinion authored by the Chief Justice, which distinguishes the
Constitution's narrow definition of "treaties" from the Convention's
broader definition, 13 and the other a 1one dissenting opinion by Justice
Blackmun, citing the Vienna Convention as incidental support for
principles already firmly entrenched in federal common law. 14 No
member of the Court has ever appealed to the Vienna Convention for an
independent and controlling rule of decision.
By contrast, many lower federal and state courts apply the
Convention's treaty-interpretation provisions routinely as customary
international law. "When resolving [treaty-related] questions," the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained recently, "we apply the
rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties." 15 Although the Senate has yet to
ratify the Vienna Convention, these courts rely on the Convention as a
"restatement of customary rules" that "binds States regardless of
whether they are parties." 16
Tensions between the Vienna Convention's customary canons and
the Supreme Court's nationalist treaty jurisprudence raise challenging
questions about the interrelationship between international and domestic
treaty law: Is "the practice of nations under customary international
law," as expressed in the Vienna Convention, indeed "of little aid" in
domestic treaty interpretation? When U.S. courts interpret treaties,
should they look to customary international law for guidance?
To date, few have answered Justice Rehnquist's challenge. For
example, the American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) on the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement) openly
acknowledges the nationalist/internationalist schism in U.S. treaty

13. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (noting that the Vienna Convention "does
not distinguish between agreements designated as 'treaties' and other agreements" between
States, while the Constitutional meaning of the word "treaty" is restricted to instruments
concluded pursuant to Article II, § 2, cl. 2).
14. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citing the Convention for the proposition that a treaty "must first be construed according to its
'ordinary meaning"').
15. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 433 (2d Cir. 2001).
16. Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301,308 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Maria
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA.
J. INT'L L. 281, 286 (1988)) (citing opinions of the International Court of Justice). A Westlaw
search finds that Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention have been cited only thirteen times by
U.S. federal courts and two times by state courts. In comparison, Westlaw indicates that the
European Court of Human Rights has cited these provisions twenty-three times.
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interpretation, 17 yet vacillates between the two approaches, res1stmg
some customary international canons which conflict with U.S. practice,
while accepting others as binding "even if the United States
jurisprudence of interpretation might have led to a different result." 18
Other commentators have given the issues similarly short shrift.
This article bridges the gap between the nationalist and
internationalist approaches in U.S. treaty interpretation by seeking
answers to three interrelated questions: First, how do contemporary
common law canons differ from the Vienna Convention's
internationalist approach? Second, have U.S. courts historically
approached treaty interpretation from a nationalist or internationalist
perspective? Third, is the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework
compatible with the United States' constitutional commitments and
sovereign prerogatives as currently recognized by U.S. courts?
Part I addresses the first of these questions by exploring the Vienna
Convention's drafting history and by contrasting its salient provisions
with contemporary common law canons. Although the Senate has not
ratified the Vienna Convention, the United States is a signatory, and
both the executive and legislative branches employ the Convention as
an authoritative guide to international treaty law. The Vienna
Convention and the nationalist approaches differ in at least three critical
respects: First, the Vienna Convention gives courts less freedom to
explore extra-textual materials beyond travaux preparatoires. Second,
although the Vienna Convention discourages courts from deferring to a
single state's uncorroborated treaty interpretations, domestic courts
regularly give substantial deference to executive branch
interpretations--even when treaty partners contest these interpretations.
Third, the nationalist approach and the Vienna Convention take
radically different approaches to customary international law as an
interpretive guide. These methodological distinctions are not merely of
academic interest, I argue, because they go to the heart of a much larger
debate concerning U.S. courts' proper institutional role in resolving
international disputes. Whereas the Vienna Convention envisions
municipal courts in treaty cases as quasi-international tribunals
committed to traditional rule-of-law values, the nationalist approach
views U.S. courts as agents of national sovereignty with an obligation to
maximize the United States' immediate strategic interests. Thus, the
choice between the Vienna Convention and nationalist treaty canons
17. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, cmt. (d)-(g), at 197-98 (1987) (discussing differences
between the Vienna Convention's rules and U.S. practice).
18. !d. at 201 n.4.
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engages broader debates over American exceptionalism in foreign
affairs.
Part II explores international treaty canons' traditional role in U.S.
jurisprudence. The Constitution gives the federal judiciary stewardship
over domestic treaty law, but it provides little guidance concerning the
principles that courts should apply in treaty construction. Since the
founding, however, the Supreme Court has recognized that U.S. courts
must interpret treaties according to internationally authoritative canons.
The current nationalist/internationalist tension in U.S. treaty
interpretation owes more to historical accident and common law inertia,
I argue, than constitutional principle or original intent.
Part III evaluates contemporary justifications for the United States'
nationalist approach. American scholars typically rationalize departures
from the Vienna Convention's guidelines by raising constitutional
objections and casting doubt on customary international law's nature
and function. This discussion demonstrates, however, that relatively few
elements of the nationalist approach are strictly required as a matter of
U.S. constitutional or international law. Excepting Senate reservations,
declarations, and understandings, courts have no legitimate legal
justification to disregard international treaty canons.
Looking forward, Part IV argues that U.S. courts may revitalize the
internationalist paradigm in U.S. treaty jurisprudence by applying the
Vienna Convention's customary canons as U.S. law. The Vienna
Convention enhances U.S. treaty law's coherence and provides a
potential corrective to the nationalist approach's disregard for non-state
actors. The Convention also focuses courts' attention on the
international legitimacy and acceptability of domestic treaty-related
decisions. Finally, the Convention's customary canons provide a
rudimentary legal grammar (i.e., a set of common concepts and
principles) that may facilitate more effective dialogue between foreign,
international, and domestic courts. Incorporating these customary
canons into U.S. jurisprudence represents a critical step toward the
development of a coordinated international system for treaty
adjudication.

I.

U.S.

TREATY INTERPRETATION AT A CROSSROADS

Globalization's acceleration has forced nation-states to adopt
innovative, collaborative strategies to handle the expanding
transnational dimensions of commerce, communications, criminal
networks, environmental harms, human migration, and other collective
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concerns. International agreements like the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty lend enhanced clarity to public and private legal regimes in the
international arena. But the proliferation of international regulatory
agreements raises yet another pressing dilemma of transnational
proportions: the need to develop internationally acceptable principles
for interpreting international agreements.
As this part demonstrates, the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties represents the global community's authoritative response to this
global problem. The Vienna Convention provides a distinct interpretive
framework founded on authoritative principles of customary
international law. To the extent that U.S. courts have not fully
assimilated the Vienna Convention's customary canons, I argue that this
methodological dissonance reflects a basic tension between two
competing visions of U.S. courts' appropriate role in treaty litigation:
( 1) an internationalist approach attuned to international custom and
committed to the promotion of an orderly international system, and (2) a
nationalist approach that draws interpretive principles analogically from
national law and adapts to shifting foreign-policy preferences.

A.

The Treaty to Govern All Treaties

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties represents the
culminating achievement of a decades-long effort to establish an
international grammar for treaty interpretation. Pursuant to Article 13 of
the UN Charter, 19 the UN General Assembly delegated this task to the
International Law Commission (ILC), a working group of thirty-four
leading publicists charged with "making the evidence of customary
international law more readily available" through the codification and
progressive development of international custom. 20 The ILC labored
over its "treaty on treaties" 21 for over two decades, engaging the talents
of many of the leading internationalist scholars of the era; ILC
rapporteurs during this period included such eminent legal luminaries as

19. U.N. CHARTER art. 13. Article 13 authorizes the General Assembly to "initiate studies
and make recommendations" for the following purposes:
Promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification;
Promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational,
and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
!d. at 12.
20. MARK E. VILUGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 75-76 (1997).
21. Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495
(1970).
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James L. Brierly, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and
Sir Humphrey Waldock. 22 The Commission's 1966 draft convention
provided the starting point for the UN Conference on the Law of
Treaties, which convened on March 26, 1968. 23
The Conference's final product-the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties-consists of eight parts and a brief annex. Subjects
addressed include treaties' conclusion and entry into force (II);
observation, application, and interpretation (III); amendment and
modification (IV); invalidity, termination, and suspension (V); and
depositaries, notification, corrections, and registration (VII). For present
purposes, however, the Convention's most important provisions are
Articles 31-33, which incorporate customary international treaty canons
into a unified interpretive framework.
Article 31 enshrines a robust textualist canon: treaties, are to be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty." 24 As one ILC member explained during
a drafting session, "[t]he starting point of interpretation is the
elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into
the intentions of the parties."25 Where feasible, courts should construe
provisions in a manner that honors the agreement's "object and
purpose."26 In addition, a treaty's terms are to be understood "in their
context," 27 which the Convention defines narrowly as including, "in
addition to the text [and] the preamble and annexes":
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
22. /d. at 51.
23. For a comprehensive
record of the Conference proceedings, see United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ll (1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Conference I] and United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Official Records, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/Il/Add.! ( 1970) [hereinafter Vienna
Conference 2]; E.W. Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between Parties to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States not Party to the Convention, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 779,779 {1982).
24. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1). Interpreters are only to depart from a term's
ordinary meaning "if it is established that the parties so intended." /d. art. 31(4); see also
Advisory Opinion, Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 8 (Mar. 3) ("The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor to
give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of which they occur.").
25. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its 17th Session and
on its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 220, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l [hereinafter
Reports].
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1).
27. /d. art. 31{1).
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[and]
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 28
Such ancillary agreements and instruments facilitate successful
negotiation by clarifying sensitive diplomatic compromises that find
imprecise expression within the original treaty text.
Recognizing that strict adherence to a treaty provision's ordinary
meaning will occasionally lead to unreasonable or absurd results, the
Convention's drafters softened Article 31's "ordinary meaning"
presumption with several important caveats. First, interpreters may
attribute a "special meaning" to a particular term if the treaty's text
suggests that the parties intended to use treaty terms in an idiosyncratic
sense. 29 Second, courts may deviate from "ordinary meaning" when
treaty parties conclude a subsequent agreement that otherwise elucidates
or reconfigures "the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions. " 30 Third, interpreters may consider parties' "subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation." 31 Like subsequent
agreements, parties' post-ratification practice may reflect an implicit
agreement to revise the original treaty document.
Article 33, which governs the interpretation of treaties authenticated
in two or more languages, offers yet another basis for departure from
Article 31's "ordinary meaning" canon. Unless otherwise expressed, the
Convention declares that a treaty text "is equally authoritative in each
[authenticated] language."32 Where incongruences in translation render a
text's "ordinary meaning" ambiguous, Article 33 instructs courts to look
for zones of overlapping signification, on the presumption that treaties
bear "the same meaning in each authentic text. " 33
Finally, Article 32 rounds out the exceptions to the Vienna
Convention's textualist canon by providing for judicial recourse to
"supplementary means of interpretation":
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

!d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.

art. 31 (2).
art. 31 (4).
art. 31(3)(a).
art. 31(3)(a)-(b).
art. 33(1).
art. 33(3)-(4).
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resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: leaves
the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.34
Construed strictly, Article 32 decrees that courts may not consider
travaux prtiparatoires except in extraordinary cases where Article 31
would render an ambiguous, obscure, "manifestly" absurd, or otherwise
unreasonable result. Article 32 does not specify with great precision,
however, how much ambiguity or obscurity must persist after Article 31
analysis in order to trigger Article 32(a). The Convention's assertion
that courts may reference preparatory material "in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31" suggests that even
reasonable doubt may justify Article 32 analysis. This weaker
formulation tracks courts' actual practice more closely and reflects a
more realistic portrait of the adjudicatory process; as long as litigants
bring travaux to courts' attention-as they always do-courts cannot
prevent Article 31 analysis from becoming prematurely "contaminated"
by these supplementary materials. 35 Indeed, the ILC itself recognized
that the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework should be
understood as "accumulative, not consecutive." 36 Articles 31 and 32
might assign different weight to different sources, but interpreters
should not convert these provisions into an overly mechanistic process.
No matter how one spins Article 32, the provision clearly anticipates
that courts will privilege a text's "ordinary meaning" over insights
34. I d. art. 32. "Supplementary means of interpretation" may include traditional interpretive
canons such as lex specialis derogat legi generali (specific rule prevails over general rule) and lex
posterior derogat /egi prior (last in time rule). ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 200-0 I (2000). However, the Vienna Convention clearly disfavors domestic
ratification materials outside the agreement's official travaux preparatoire.
35. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21
VAND . J. TRANSNAT ' L L. 281 , 296-97 (1988) (expressing skepticism regarding the courts '
capacity to consider travaux as a second-level consideration without having this analysis color
their first-level textualist construction). The ICJ has, in fact, refused to consider preparatory work
in at least one case where the text alone was deemed sufficiently clear:
The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty of a tribunal which is called
upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to
them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. If the
relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is
an end of the matter.
Competence of the General Assembly, supra note 24, at 8. But it has also appealed to travaux in
other cases in order to confirm conclusions reached by other means. E.g., Convention of 1919
Concerning the Work of Women at Night, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser.AIB) No. 50, at 380; see generally
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 608-09 {2d ed. 1973) (describing
the ICJ's jurisprudence in this area).
36. Reports supra note 25, at 204.
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culled from supplementary sources. Ironically, to the extent that Articles
31 and 32 admit ambiguity, the Convention's drafting and negotiation
records plainly confirm this principle. During the Vienna Conference
negotiations, the United States' chief delegate, Yale Law School
Professor Myres McDougal, vigorously challenged the hierarchy of
sources enshrined in Articles 31 and 32. In McDougal's view, this
interpretive two-step processwould unnecessarily place states' actual
negotiated agreements at risk:
The rigid and restrictive system of articles [31] and [32] should
not be made international law because it could be employed by
interpreters to impose upon the parties to a treaty agreements that
they had never made. The parties ... could well have a common
intent quite different from that expressed by the "ordinary"
meaning of the terms used in the text. The imposition upon the
parties of certain alleged "ordinary" meanings ... could lead to the
arbitrary distortion of their real intentions. 37
In place of the draft convention's "rigid and restrictive" hierarchy of
sources, McDougal proposed a more flexible amendment that would
give interpreters greater discretion in weighing a treaty's text vis-a-vis
extrinsic sources. This amendment received scant support, however,
from McDougal's peers at the Conference. Delegates from developing
countries feared that broad reference to travaux would privilege wealthy
nations capable of maintaining superior archives. 38 More importantly,
delegates feared that this flexible approach would give treaty
interpreters carte blanche to disregard clear, textual meanings in favor
of spurious unilateralist interpretations. Uruguay's delegate offers a
representative critique of McDougal's proposal:
International law should avoid the idea of a "will of the parties"
floating like a cloud over the terra firma of a contractual text. If
respect for the wording of a treaty that had been signed and
ratified was not something sacred, if the parties were to be
allowed freely to invoke their supposed real will, an essential
advantage ofwritten and conventional law would be lost. 39
The vast majority of countries represented at the Conference agreed that
the original ILC draft should prevail since this predominately textualist
approach-rather than the
McDougal's more
contextual
37. Vienna Conference
I, supra note 23, at 167-68;
see also Official Records,
Documents of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/C.I/L.I5 (I 969).
38. Keamey & Dalton, supra note 21, at 520.
39. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23 , at 170.
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approach-offered a "neutral and fair formulation of the generally
recognized canons of treaty interpretation."40
In the end, the Conference decisively rejected McDougal's proposal
by a vote of sixty-six nations against to eight nations in favor, with ten
abstentions. 41 When the Conference reconvened one year later, the ILC
draft passed unanimously. 42
President Nixon transmitted the completed Convention to the Senate
in 1971, stressing treaties' increasingly vital role in international
governance and the need to support "well defined and readily
ascertainable rules of international law applicable to the subject."43 The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out a resolution of advice
and consent to ratification, but conditioned this resolution upon a
special understanding and interpretation with respect to Article 46. This
article declares that states' failure to observe internal procedural
requirements when concluding treaties does not invalidate a treaty for
international purposes unless "that violation was manifest and
concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance."44 The
Committee's proposed understanding qualified Article 46 to account for
treaties' special constitutional status within U.S. law:
[I]t is a rule of internal law of the United States of fundamental
importance that no treaty (as defined by paragraph l(a) of Article
2 of the Convention) is valid with respect to the United States,
and the consent of the United States may not be given regarding
any such treaty, unless the Senate of the United States has given
its advice and consent to such treaty, or the terms of such treaty
have been approved by law, as the case may be. 45
The State Department objected to the Committee's interpretation,
fearing that it would cause other states to believe that the United States
would no longer honor its preexisting congressional-executive
agreements (agreements passed by a majority of both houses rather than
a supermajority of the Senate) and pure executive agreements
40. Kearney & Dalton, supra note 21, at 520.
41. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23, at 185.
42. Vienna Conference 2, supra note 23, at 57. To date, eighty-three countries have signed
the Vienna Convention. Thirty-eight have formally ratified or acceded to the agreement. Vienna
Convention, supra note 9, at 332.
43. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences ofParticipation and
Nonparticipation, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 277, 276 (1984) (remarks by Robert E. Dalton).
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 46(1). "A violation is manifest if it would be
objectively evident to any state conducting itself in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith." !d. art. 46(2).
45. Dalton, supra note 43, at 276.
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(agreements concluded by the executive branch alone). 46 The two sides
made little progress in resolving this dilemma, and the resolution of
advice and consent stalled in committee. On January 27, 1980, the
Vienna Convention entered into force without U.S. ratification. 47 To
date, the United States remains a signatory to the Vienna Convention,
but the Senate has yet to furnish the consent required for ratification
under the Constitution.
Although the Vienna Convention does not apply in the United States
as a matter of domestic treaty law, many of the principles codified in the
Convention have force nonetheless as expressions of customary
international law. 48 The Secretary of State's letter submitting the
Convention to the Senate for formal ratification observed that although
the Vienna Convention was "not yet in force," the document was
nevertheless already "generally recognized as the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice."49 In subsequent communications, the
State Department has explained further that the Vienna Convention
represents "a primary source of reference for determining ... the
customary principles of treaty law,"50 which the Department consults
"in dealing with day-to-day treaty problems."51
When executive declarations affirm customary international norms,
these norms naturally have claim to greater jurisprudential legitimacy in
domestic courts. Indeed, even the most outspoken critics of
contemporary customary international law generally accept that courts
may apply these norms when they receive "authorization from the
political branches." 52 The State Department's representations in treaty
transmittal letters, congressional hearings, and the like may not be
legally binding to the same extent as formal executive orders
46. Id. at 276-77.
47. Vierdag, supra note 23, at 779.
48. The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary international law as
"general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 (stating that
customary international law "results form general and consistent practice of states followed by
them out of a sense of legal obligation").
49. Secretary of State Rogers' Report to the President, Oct. 18, 1971, 65 DEP'T ST. BULL.
684,685 (1971).
50. Dalton, supra note 43, at 278; see also S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971).
51. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 65 AM. J.
lNT'L L. 599,605 (1971).
52. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique ofthe Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,868,870 (1997) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique]. Whether Bradley and Goldsmith would recognize the Vienna
Convention as customary international law in the absence of an express executive order is not,
however, entirely clear.
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promulgated by the President. Nevertheless, these declarations merit
considerable respect as guides to the United States' general intent in
treaty negotiations and as expert opinions regarding customary
international treaty law's content.
The State Department's acceptance of the Vienna Convention as an
authoritative guide to customary international law also comports with
the general principles that govern customary international law. Over the
last half-century, quasi-universal conventions such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 53 and the United Nations Conventions on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)54 have blurred traditional distinctions
between positive and customary international law. According to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), multilateral conventions such as
these may reflect customary international law in three cases: First, a
treaty provision may be "declaratory of pre-existing custom." Second, a
treaty provision may "crystallize customary law in the process of
formation." Third, a treaty provision may fall within the ambit of
customary international law if it successfully "generates new customary
law subsequent to its adoption." 55 The ICJ embraced this last category
most explicitly in The North Sea Cases:
[A] norm creating provision which has constituted the foundation
of, or has generated a rule which, while only conventional or
contractual in origin, has since passed into the general corpus of
international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio
juris, [becomes] binding even for countries which have never,
and do not, become parties to the Convention. 56
Pursuant to these principles, the ICJ applies some multilateral

53. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. N811 (1948).
54. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, U.N. Doc. NConf.131L.52-L.55
[hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also President's Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1983
Pub. Papers 378, 378 (Mar. 10, 1983) (announcing that the United States would honor UNCLOS
and stating that the Convention contained "provisions with respect to the traditional uses of the
oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interest
of all states").
55. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL ., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 101 (1993). In
fact, because international custom exists independent of treaties themselves, the provisions of a
treaty that are not yet in force may constitute customary international law binding even on
nonsignatories. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29-30
(June 3) (applying provisions of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea as customary
international law despite the fact that the Convention had not yet entered force between the
parties).
56. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den./F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 ICJ 3, 41 ~ 71 Feb.
20).
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conventions to signatories and non-signatories alike. 57 The status of
customary international law "is not lightly to be regarded as having
been attained," however; the ICJ generally refuses to enforce
multilateral conventions against non-parties absent a showing that the
relevant provisions satisfy both the generality and opinio juris
requirements. 58
U.S. courts also accept the principle that multilateral conventions
may restate, crystallize, or progressively generate international
custom. 59 The critical question for judicial determination is not whether
a particular international agreement reflects preexisting international
custom (although equivalence at the time of ratification would establish
a strong presumption that the norm remains customary); rather, courts
must decide whether, at the time of adjudication, convention provisions
and customary practice coincide. As states conform their behavior to a
convention's progressive principles, these principles may become
binding even on those states that fail to ratify the convention. 60
The ILC has confirmed that Articles 31-33 codify preexisting
customary international law. 61 Ian Brownlie, a member ofthe ILC for
57. E.g., Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 7 (Mar. 21); North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Co., Ltd. (New Application 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); S.S. Wimbledon, (Ger.
v. UK, Fr., Italy, Japan), 1923 P.C.J.J. (ser. A) No. I, at 182 (Aug. 17).
58. See Hiram Chodosh, An Interpretive Theory of International Law: The Distinction
Between Treaty and International Law, 28 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 973, 1041-42 (1995) (citing
the ICJ's Asylum case (Columbia/Peru) and the North Sea Continental Shelf case (Federal
Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands)).
59. The Supreme Court's oft-cited 1900 decision, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900), relied upon several bilateral treaties as evidence of international maritime custom. !d. at
687-88, 691. More recently, the Second Circuit's influential Filcirtiga decision suggested that
conventions such as the UN Declaration of Human Rights "create[] an expectation of adherence,
and 'insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, ... may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."' Filartiga v. Pefta-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
883 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting M.G.K. Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and United States
Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978)); HowardS. Schrader, Note, Custom
and General Principles as Sources ofInternational Law in American Federal Courts, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1982) (demonstrating that U.S. courts deduce customary international law
from treaties).
60. The Restatement recognizes this rule: "[C)odification of branches of international law by
international bodies ... have provided authoritative text as a source for restatement of some
topics." In fact, the Restatement specifically cites the Vienna Convention as a prime example of
this phenomenon. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6.
61. In theory, the ILC is required to employ differentiated procedures for the codification and
progressive development of customary international law. While this bright-line procedural
distinction does not always obtain in practice, the ILC often sends other signals to communicate
whether it approaches its task in a particular instance as primarily to codify existing customary
law or to progressively generate new custom. !d. at 78-79, 99. In drafting of Articles 31-33, the
ILC clearly envisioned its role as codifying preexisting custom.
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the drafting of Articles 31-33, explains that the Commission did not
seek to develop new canons for treaty construction; instead, it sought
only to isolate "the comparatively general principles which appear to
constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties." 62 For example,
the Commission's decision to adopt a predominantly textualist approach
reflected the customary practice recognized in numerous ICJ
decisions. 63 Article 31's "ordinary meaning" canon reflected generally
accepted practices identified years earlier by both the Institute of
International Law64 and the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ). 65 In short, rather than pioneer a progressive system for treaty
interpretation, as the Restatement suggests, Articles 31-33 actually
provided a comparatively skeletal guide to basic principles that were
already well entrenched in customary international law.
Numerous domestic, foreign, and international tribunals have
recognized that the Vienna Convention codifies customary international
treaty law. The ICJ invokes the Vienna Convention routinely, 66 citing
even some of its most controversial provisions as customary law and
applying these principles to signatories and non-signatories alike. 67 In
Libya v. Chad, 68 for example, the ICJ specifically emphasized Article
31's customary status:
The Court would recall that, in accordance with customary
international law, reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object
62. BROWNLIE, supra note 35, at 624.
63. /d.
64. Vienna Conference I, supra note 23, at 177.
65 . BROWNLIE, supra note 35, at 626 (citing Advisory Opinion No. II, Polish Postal Service
in Danzig, 1925 P.C.l .J. (ser. B.) No. II, 37, at 39 (May 16) (finding "a cardinal principle of
interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would normally have in their
context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd")); Reports
supra note 25, at 172, 185.
66. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. and lr. v. Ice.), 1974 l.C.J. 3, at 14 (citing Article 52
regarding agreements under threat of force); Advisory Opinion, Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, 1971 l.C.J. 16, 47 (June 21) (discussing the Convention's provisions on treaty breach as
reflecting customary international law). In fact, the ICJ has never found a provision of the Vienna
Convention to be inconsistent with customary international law. AUST, supra note 34, at II.
67. See France-United Kingdom: Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, 54
Int'l L. Rep. 6; 18 l.L.M. 397 (1979). Courts recognize, however, that these canons operate only
as residual defaults; treaty parties may freely abrogate the Vienna Convention by express
agreement. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The Consequences of Participation
and Nonparticipation, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC . 270, 272 (1984) (remarks by Sir. Ian
Sinclair).
68. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 ICJ 4, 16 (Feb. 3).
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and purpose. Interpretation must be based above all upon the
text of the treaty. As a supplementary measure recourse may be
had to means of interpretation such as the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 69
Most national and regional courts have followed the ICJ's lead,
invoking the Convention "as an authoritative source of law, thus
gradually transforming its innovative features into customary law
through such application."70 The European Court of Human Rights, for
example, chose to apply Articles 31-33 as "generally accepted
principles of international law" well before the Vienna Convention even
entered force. 71 Similarly, every American court to address the Vienna
Convention's legal authority has concluded that its provisions express
binding customary norms. 72 Notwithstanding the United States' failure
to ratify the Vienna Convention, U.S. courts regularly apply Articles 3133 as customary law. 73
69. /d. at 21.
70. LOUIS HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 416 ( 1993).
71. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. (serA) No.l8 (1975).
72. E.g. , Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e apply the
rules of customary international law enunciated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties"); Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000)
("We ... treat the Vienna Convention as an authoritative guide to the customary international law
of treaties."); Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing the Vienna Convention ' s
directive that treaty text "must be interpreted ' in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms ...."'); Aquamar, S.A . v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279,
1296 n.40 (lith Cir. 1999) ("Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention,
it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention as codifying the international law
of treaties.") (quoting Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp S.A. de C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1994)); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although the
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the
Vienna Convention as codifying the international law of treaties."); Haitian Centers Council v.
Sale, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[P]rinciples of treaty construction are themselves codified,
in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties."); R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto
Spa, 920 F. Supp. 1100 (D.Nev. 1996) ("The United States is not a signatory to the Vienna
Convention; however, it has been a policy of the United States that Articles 31 and 32 are
declaratory of customary international law, and will be so applied in the United States."); Logan
v. Dupuis, 990 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1997) ("Although the United States is not a party to the
Vienna Convention, it regards the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention (and
specifically, Article 31) as codifying the customary international law of treaties."); Busby v.
State, 40 P.3d 807 (Alaska App. 2002) ("[B]oth federal and state courts have acknowledged and
employed the principles of interpretation codified in the Vienna Convention. We will too."); State
v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267, 273 n.3 (N.M. 2001).
73. E.g., Haitian Centers Council v. Sale, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-62 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Rather
than having evolved from a judicial common law, ... principles of treaty construction are
themselves codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties."); Gonzalez
v. Guitierrez, 311 F.3d 942,949 n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) ("While the United States is not a signatory
to the Vienna Convention, it is the policy of the United States to apply articles 31 and 32 as
customary international law."); Busby v. State, 40 P.3d 807 (AI. App. 2002) (applying Articles 31
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In sum, the Vienna Convention's interpretive methodology is
distinctive in several respects. First, Article 31 declares that courts must
interpret treaty provisions "in good faith" according to their "ordinary
meaning" and consistent with the treaty's broader "object and purpose."
Unusual, subjective interpretations lack force unless other treaty
partners ratify these interpretations by express agreement or consistent
post-ratification practice. 74 Second, the Convention enshrines a canon
against interpretations in derogation of international law, presuming
instead that states negotiate agreements against the backdrop of their
preexisting international obligations. Third, when textualist and
teleological readings leave a provision's meaning ambiguous, Article 32
allows courts to seek additional illumination from a treaty's formal
ratification record. Executive branch practice and general principles of
international legal theory confirm the conclusion reached by numerous
domestic, foreign, and international tribunals: Articles 31-33 of the

and 32 as customary international law).
A few commentators have questioned whether Articles 31-33 accurately reflect customary
international law. The Restatement provides the preeminent example:
Customary international law has not developed rules and modes of interpretation
having the definiteness and precision to which [the Vienna Convention] aspires.
Therefore, unless the Vienna Convention comes into force in the United States, [Articles
31 through 33 do] not govern interpretation by the United States or by courts in the
United States. But it represents generally accepted principles and the United States has
already appeared willing to accept them despite differences in nuance and emphasis.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 325, cmt. (a). Maria Frankowska similarly asserts that "it is still
debatable whether [Articles 31-33] simply codified the then existing customary law or whether
they generated such law." Frankowska, supra note 16, at 332. These critics offer little support,
however, for the proposition that customary international law lacks the Convention's
"definiteness and precision" aside from the observation that U.S. courts have not uniformly
followed the Vienna Convention's prescribed methodology. As the foregoing analysis
demonstrates, there is compelling evidence that Articles 31-33 reflect customary international
law.
74. By the terms
"subjective interpretation" and "subjective intent," I have in mind
McDougal's suggestion that treaty texts and travaux preparatoires often inaccurately represent
the negotiating parties' actual political bargains. "Subjective interpretations" may arise from
allegations that negotiators' actual "meeting of the minds" produced special understandings that
would be frustrated by strict enforcement of treaties' textual expression. States may also insist
that treaties must be construed according to the unilateralist understanding of domestic political
institutions (e.g., the President or Senate). Interpretations in the first category are "subjective" in
the sense that they discount treaty text and accord heightened deference to states' unilateral
interpretations. Interpretations in the second category share these qualities, but may also be
"subjective" in the sense that they would distinguish treaties' domestic legal meaning from their
meaning under foreign and international law. For a defense of this dualist approach, see Curtis A.
Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589-90 (2003). "Objective interpretation," on the other hand, aims to
establish as accurately as possible states' intent at the time of contracting as expressed in
instruments and conduct accessible to all parties.
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Vienna Convention represent binding canons of customary international
law.

B.

The Nationalist and Internationalist Approaches

Notwithstanding the Vienna Convention's customary status, U.S.
courts have not consistently followed the Convention's interpretive
framework. The Supreme Court has never relied upon the Vienna
Convention as an authoritative source of law. 75 A growing number of
federal courts and two states recognize the Vienna Convention as an
authoritative codification of customary treaty canons/6 but few
recognize the degree to which the Convention's guidelines differ from
U.S. practice.
The Vienna Convention's imperfect assimilation into U.S. law
reflects an unresolved conflict between two competing visions of
domestic courts' institutional role in treaty-related litigation. One vision
suggests that domestic courts take part in an international judicial
system when they adjudicate treaty cases and bear a duty to interpret
treaties according to internationally accepted standards. Another vision
posits the judicial branch as a steward of national sovereignty entrusted
with the responsibility to safeguard national legal norms and political
preferences. 77 Viewed from this latter perspective, treaties have force in
domestic law only by virtue of the Constitution, and Article III
courts-the oracles of American constitutional law-have inherent
authority to develop parochial treaty canons even if these canons depart
from customary international law. Whereas internationalist judges apply
the Vienna Convention in order to facilitate transnational legal order,
nationalist judges give the political branches maximum discretion to
interpret and perform the United States' international obligations
according to prevailing national political preferences.

75. See discussion supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
76. See cases cited supra note 72.
77. This nationalist/internationalist tension is a natural dynamic of international legal
federalism and plays an important role in virtually every aspect of the United States'
internalization of international norms. See HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
446-47 (1952) (describing the enduring tension between nationalist and internationalist traditions
as "guided by ethical or political preferences" rather than "the science of law"); see, e.g., Curtis
A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 529 (1999) (advocating a dualist approach to U.S. treaty practice, with special reference to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Harold Hongju Koh, International Business
Transactions in United States Courts, 261 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1996)(discerning this tension
in international business transactions).
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Should Courts Privilege Extrinsic Sources over Texts?

Both the nationalist and internationalist approaches to treaty
interpretation consider a court's main objective to be the identification
and enforcement of parties' collective intent. These approaches proffer
strikingly different methodologies, however, for ascertaining state
intent. The nationalist approach-tracking contemporary American
contract theory-seeks to identify party intent by drawing
indiscriminately upon all available evidence of parties' respective
expectations. The international approach, on the other hand, follows the
Vienna Convention's injunction to focus on objective indicia of party
intent such as treaty text and travaux preparatoires.
General principles of contract law play a central role in both the
nationalist and internationalist approaches. 78 For centuries, leading
publicists such as Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vattel characterized
treaties as "public compacts" analogous to private contracts. 79 The
founding generation of American statesmen-themselves steeped in the
great treatises of Grotius and Vattel-also frequently invoked general
principles of private contract law to define and delimit the treaty power.
Alexander Hamilton's famous explanation in Federalist No. 7 IS
representative:
The power of making treaties ... relates neither to the execution of
the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new ones, and still less
to an exertion of the common strength. Its objects are contracts
with foreign nations, which have the force of law, but derive it
from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed
by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between
sovereign and sovereign. 80
Building upon this contract analogy, the contemporary nationalist
approach encourages courts to develop common law treaty canons by
incorporating principles from domestic contract law. "In interpreting an
78. Professor David Bederman traces this private contract analogy in treaty interpretation to
the earliest compacts among the Ancient Greek city-states. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CLASSICAL
CANONS: RHETORIC, CLASSICISM AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 46-67 (200 I).
79. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Ch. XV, § I (Louise R. Loomis trans.,
Walter J. Black 1949) (1625) (describing treaties as forms of contract); EMMERICH DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, Ch. XVII, § 267-68 (Charles G.
Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (analogizing treaty interpretation to contract interpretation); see also
EUGENE RAFTOPOULOS, THE INADEQUACY OF THE CONTRACTUAL ANALOGY IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES 84 (1990). Significantly, Grotius still supported the development of objective rules for
treaty interpretation. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 119.
80. THE FEDERALIST NO.7 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McCellan eds.,
2001) (emphasis added).
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international treaty," the Supreme Court proclaimed in Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 81 "we are
mindful that it is 'in the nature of a contract between nations ... to which
[g]eneral rules of construction apply. "' 82 Because judges are often
unfamiliar with foreign contract law, recourse to "general rules" of
contract law inevitably reflects an American-law bias.
Among the more important "general rules" that U.S. courts have
drawn from domestic contract law is the modem parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule conceptualizes contract texts as mere symbolic
expressions of parties' actual intent. It recognizes that a treaty's text
often provides the best evidence of parties' actual intentions but
encourages courts to consult extrinsic sources liberally to pinpoint party
intent as accurately as possible. When courts decide that an agreement's
textual expression does not accurately reflect the parties' actual,
unformalized intentions, courts give parties' subjective intent
precedence over their objective representations. 83
81. 482 u.s. 522 (1987).
82. !d. at 533 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253,
262 (1984)); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A treaty is essentially a contract between or among sovereign
nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) ("[T]reaties are contracts between
independent nations .... "); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) ("Writers of authority agree
that treaties are to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the interpretation of contracts
in writing between individuals ... with a view to making effective the purposes of the high
contracting parties .... "); Zicherman v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) ("[A]
treaty ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land ... but also an agreement among
sovereign powers"); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979); Harris v. US, 768 F.2d 1240, 1242 (lith Cir. 1985)
("International agreements should be construed more like contracts than statutes.").
83. John A. Townsend,
Tax Treaty Interpretation, 55 TAX LAW 219, 239-40 (2001).
Interestingly, the parol evidence rule first entered U.S. treaty jurisprudence through an Indian
treaty case-the Supreme Court's 1943 decision, Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318
U.S. 423 (1943)--rather than a case involving a treaty with a foreign nation. Construing a treaty
between the United States and the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes, the Supreme Court offered the
following dictum:
[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.
!d. at 431-32. Although courts have read this passage broadly to apply to all U.S. treaties, the
Supreme Court originally designed the liberal use of extrinsic sources as a response to Indian
treaties' unique deficiencies. By softening its traditional textualist approach in this context, the
Choctaw Nation Court attempted to compensate for the United States' disproportionate
bargaining power in treaty negotiations with Indian tribes, the obvious disparities in negotiating
skills and legal expertise, and language barriers that prevented tribes from critically evaluating
treaty texts. Anthony A. Lusvardi, Note, Montana v. United States-Effects on Liberal Treaty
Interpretation and Indian Rights to Land Underlying Navigable Waters, 57 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 689, 690-91 ( 1982). Recognizing that the United States might easily manipulate treaty
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One court describes this rule's operation in treaty construction thus:
The basic aim of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intent of
the parties who have entered into agreement, in order to construe
the document in a manner consistent with that intent. ... We must
therefore examine all available evidence of the shared
expectations of the parties to this Convention in order to answer
the interrelated questions [raisedJ_B4
By widening the scope of judicial investigation beyond the four
comers of a treaty's text, the parol evidence rule aims to "facilitat[e] the
ability of private parties to reach voluntary bargains through
manifesting shared understandings, and [to] limit[] judges' ability to
frustrate these bargains through 'objective' interpretations. "' 85 An
agreement's "ordinary meaning" may serve as the starting point for
judicial investigation, but this ceremonial symbol of the parties'
agreement represents only one of several factors under judicial
consideration. 86
Numerous cases witness the parol evidence rule's recent
entrenchment in U.S. treaty jurisprudence. Consider, for example, the
Supreme Court's 1986 decision, 0 'Connor v. United States, 87 which

provisions to tribes' prejudice, the Supreme Court departed from its previous textualist baseline in
order to protect tribes' actual expectations.
The Court's extension of Choctaw Nation to the interpretation of treaties with foreign nations
represents one of the great ironies in U.S. foreign affairs law. When domestic courts interpret
international agreements today, they typically invoke Choctaw Nation to rationalize increasing
the federal government's influence, rather than to correct for the United States' disproportionate
bargaining power in negotiations with other nation-states.
84. Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1962) (emphasis added).
85. Stephen Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modem Parol Evidence Rule and its Implications for
New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 207 (1998).
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, at 200 n.4. One commentator offers the following
observation:
The courts of most countries interpret international agreements in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the text of the agreement; the object and purpose of the agreement
is merely ancillary, casting light on the ordinary meaning. The courts of the United
States, however, have a distinctly different approach to interpretation. The ordinary
meaning of words is for American courts merely one of the factors to be taken into
account in the interpretive process. The prime objective of interpretation by American
courts is to ascertain the meaning intended by the parties.
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW (Jacobs and Roberts eds., 1987).
87. 479 U.S. 27 (1986). Other treaty cases, which support liberal use of extrinsic sources,
include Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 84 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991); Vo1kswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700 (1988); and Air France v. Sacks, 470 U.S. 392,
396 (1985).
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examined whether the Panama Canal Treatl8 immunized American
citizens employed in Panama by the Panama Canal Commission from
U.S. tax laws. The petitioners in 0 'Connor relied upon the plain
meaning of Article XV, Section 2 of the Panama Canal Treaty, which
specifically exempted U.S. citizen employees and their dependents
"from any taxes, fees or other charges on income received as a result of
their work for the Commission." 89 Conceding that the Treaty offered
textual evidence to support extending U.S. tax law to the petitioners, a
unanimous Court-in an opinion authored, ironically, by Justice
Scalia-focused on "the contextual case for limiting Article XV to
Panamanian taxes. " 90 Among the contextual evidence, the Court cited
pieces of negotiation history introduced by the government, including
the State Department's internal treaty drafts and post-ratification
interpretations by the executive branch. 91 These documents were not
among the official travaux prepared by the parties simultaneously with
the drafting of the Treaty itself; on the contrary, the petitioners' brief
suggests that this negotiating history was "contrived by the
government" some time later "to further its interests in litigation."92
Although the Vienna Convention discourages reference to internal
memoranda and drafts such as these, the Court consulted these sources
pursuant to the parole evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule's assimilation into U.S. treaty interpretation
has three major consequences: First, the rule significantly erodes the
age-old presumption that a treaty's text most accurately reflects treaty
parties' intent. "In foreign affairs," notes Professor Louis Henkin, "the
Supreme Court has authoritatively declared the text to be incomplete
and inadequate."93 When expectations conflict with the treaty's clear
text, courts privilege the agreement's spirit over its textual expression. 94
88. Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., T.I.A.S. No. 10030.
89. !d. art. XV, § 2 (emphasis added). The petitioners argued that the court must enforce this
provision domestically pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 894(a), which declares that "[i]ncome of any kind,
to the extent required by any treaty obligation of the United States, shall not be included in gross
income and shall be exempt from taxation .... " O'Connor, 479 U.S. at 30.
90. O'Connor, 479 U.S. at 31. As Justice Scalia's 0 'Connor opinion demonstrates,
nationalism and textualism are often difficult to reconcile in the treaty context.
91. !d. at 33 (citing Letter from John L. Haines, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Panama Canal
Commission, to David Slacter, United States Department of Justice, Dec. 20, 1982, pp. 2-3, I
App. in Nos. 85-504, 85-505, 85-506, and 85- 507 (CA Fed.), at 61-62; United States draft of§ 2
of Art. XV, I App. in Nos. 85- 504, 85-505, 85-506, and 85-507 (CA Fed.), at 74).
92. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 271.
93. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 73 (1990).
94. E.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989) (providing no more than a passing
reference to a treaty's text before invoking Choctaw Nation as a basis for resting its decision
almost exclusively on domestic ratification materials); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
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Second, the parol evidence rule institutionalizes a multifactor judicial
inquiry, in which no particular interpretive source a priori receives
greater weight or credibility than any other source. Courts explore the
full panoply of sources at their disposal-from internal diplomatic
memoranda to unilateral press releases-and accord weight to these
sources on an ad hoc basis. 95
Third, the parol evidence rule substantially enhances the executive
branch's influence in judicial treaty interpretation. As an actual treaty
signatory with access to the full negotiating record and other
documents, executive agencies have an inherent evidentiary advantage
in litigation involving private parties. The United States' extensive
archival system provides another obvious advantage vis-a-vis
developing countries-a concern specifically raised by delegates at the
Vienna Conference. 96 In addition, the vast array of negotiating materials
available for judicial consideration (including purely domestic materials
not included in the travaux preparatoires) arguably increase courts'
freedom to promote domestic interests to the detriment of foreign treaty
parties. "The Rehnquist Court cases do not provide any objective means
for selecting among [extrinsic] sources," one commentator complains.
"Once a court moves from the treaty's text, and its immediate orbit of
structural context, it is left in a void in which it is simply free to use the
materials which accord with the preferred result sought."97
Focusing on parties' subjective intent need not lead inexorably to
pro-forum bias; in theory, courts might invoke the parol evidence rule to
preserve party autonomy and correct for the United States'
disproportionate bargaining power in international treaty negotiation. In
practice, however, courts typically employ parol evidence to effectuate
executive agencies' subjective interpretations of international
agreements-notwithstanding conflicting representations from foreign
treaty partners.
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (holding that although "[t]he clear import of treaty language"
presumptively "controls," courts may disregard agreements' textual expression if "application of
the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the
intent or expectations of its signatories" (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54
(1963)); see also THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 165 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley
Richards eds., 1987) (observing that subjective intent often trumps clear text in U.S. treaty
interpretation).
95. See, e.g., Denby v. Seaboard World Airlines, 575 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1983)
("The Second Circuit has frequently indicated that language is merely one relevant consideration
in interpreting the Warsaw Convention .... The fundamental consideration in treaty interpretation
is to effectuate the treaty's evident purposes." (internal quotations omitted)).
96. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
97. BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 289.
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Although the Supreme Court continues to apply the parol evidence
rule, the Vienna Convention's holistic textualist approach has
experienced a modest revival in lower federal and state courts. As
discussed previously, the Vienna Convention dictates that courts
identify parties' objective intent as conveyed by a treaty's "ordinary
meaning" and its manifest "object and purpose."98 Travaux
preparatoires serve as ancillary interpretive guides, 99 but Article 31
cautions adjudicators to avoid imbuing treaty terms with unusual,
subjective meanings unless the treaty parties collectively ratify these
interpretations. 100 Courts consider negotiating history only as
supplementary support for provisions' plain meaning or for assistance in
cases where a provision's text, in isolation, yields an "absurd or
unreasonable" result, 101 and they avoid reliance on internal ratification
materials-including contemporaneous representations from U.S.
negotiators. 102 Like the nationalist approach captured in 0 'Connor, the
Vienna Convention permits courts to consider a treaty's travaux
preparatoires; but unlike the nationalist approach, the Convention
safeguards treaty texts as the preeminent authority in judicial treaty
interpretation. 103

2.

Should Courts Ignore the United States' Other International
Obligations?

A second critical difference between the Vienna Convention's
interpretive guidelines and the nationalist approach is their respective
receptivity toward international law as a guide to treaty interpretation.
The Vienna Convention requires treaty interpreters to take into account
"any relevant rules of international law applicable to relations between
98. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31 (1); see also International Law Commission
Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 27 U.N. Doc. N5809
(1964) (affirming that "the text [of a treaty] must be presumed to be the authentic expression of
the intention of the parties").
99. !d.
100. !d. art. 31 (3)-( 4).
101. !d. art. 32. The Restatement suggests that, in practice, international courts have varied in
their willingness to look beyond treaty text to travaux preparatoires. RESTATEMENT, supra note
6, at 199.
102. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31-32.
103. This conflict between the Vienna Convention approach and the traditional U.S. approach
closely mirrors traditional debates over courts' resort to parol evidence in contract interpretation
generally. See generally Ross & Tranen, supra note 85 (describing the U.S. evolution from an
objective theory of contract interpretation to modern subjectivist approaches); Joseph M. Perillo,
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427 (2000) (describing the objectivism/subjectivism dialectic as a recurrent theme in
contract jurisprudence).
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the parties. " 104 Courts that apply the Vienna Convention construe
treaties against the broader context of states' obligations under
international law. If a treaty provision has two reasonable
constructions-one that undermines a party's international obligations
and another that is consistent with these obligations-courts presume
that treaty partners intend to comply with international law.
This provision essentially extends a common law rule that U.S. courts
apply routinely in statutory interpretation. 105 "It has been a maxim of
statutory construction since the decision in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy," the Supreme Court proclaimed in Weinberger v.
Rossi, "that 'an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate
the laws of nations, if any other possible construction remains. "' 106 Just
as the Charming Betsy canon instructs courts to presume that Congress
intends to avoid conflicts with international law, the Vienna Convention
encourages courts to read treaties against the backdrop of international
law unless parties explicitly signal otherwise.
In the past, U.S. courts have accepted the Vienna Convention's
presumption that international agreements should not be construed in
derogation of international law. 107 Recent cases such as United States v.
Alvarez-Machain 108 suggest this internationalist presumption may be
losing force, however. In its brief to the Supreme Court, AlvarezMachain's counsel contended that cross-border abductions were "so

104. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c). This provision codifies a principle of
customary international law long recognized by courts and scholars alike. See, e.g., Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 182 (Apr. II);
Advisory Opinion No. 15, Jurisdiction of Courts of Danzig 1928 P.C.I.J.(ser. B) No. l5 (Mar. 3);
Advisory Opinion No. 10, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No.
10, at 20 (Feb. 21); D.P. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (2d ed. 1970).
105. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
106. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (internal quotation omitted) (citation
omitted). In the second half of the twentieth century, courts retreated from the analogous
presumption that courts should interpret legislation narrowly to minimize derogation from
common law rules. See, e.g .. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) ("The rule
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an
adherence to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly
intended to be given to the measure." (quoting Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640
(1930)). However, common law principles still play a significant role in statutory interpretation
today. See, e.g .. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (using the common law of torts to deduce the
types of damages available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
107. See, e.g.. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30,40 (1931) (citing De Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890), for the proposition that treaties are to be construed in reference to their
meaning under the "law of nations"); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20, 429
(1886) (presuming that treaty parties did not intend for the provisions of an extradition treaty to
depart from the parties' preexisting rights under intemationallaw).
108. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
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clearly prohibited in international law" that the treaty parties had no
reason to draft a clause expressly prohibiting this conduct. 109 Amicus
briefs from the Mexican and Canadian foreign ministries and from
numerous specialists in international law supported this construction. 110
Nevertheless, six justices flatly rejected this view, 111 concluding that the
treaty did not implicitly incorporate customary international norms:
"The Extradition Treaty has the force of law, and if, as respondent
asserts, it is self-executing, it would appear that a court must enforce it
on behalf of an individual regardless of the offensiveness of the practice
of one nation to the other nation." 112 International law might supplement
positive law under some circumstances, Alvarez-Machain implies, but
courts should not read customary norms into international accords.113
The First Circuit's 1997 decision, United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 114
also aptly illustrates the nationalist impulse to subordinate the United
States' international obligations to transitory foreign-policy interests. In
December 1995, the United States apprehended Lui Kin-Hong in
Boston's Logan Airport and announced its intention to extradite him to
Hong Kong to stand trial on bribery charges. 115 Lui challenged Hong
Kong's extradition request on the grounds that Hong Kong would be
unable to try his case before its reversion to the People's Republic of
China. By extraditing Lui to Hong Kong for prosecution, the defendant
argued, the United States would violate Article XII of its extradition
treaty with Hong Kong, which provided that "a person extradited shall
109. Brief for Respondent at II, United States v. Alvarez-Machain.
II 0. See, e.g, Brief for the
United States of Mexico as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Affirmance, Brief of the Government of Canada in Support of Respondent, Brief for Amicus
Curiae and Real Party in Interest Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, 1991 U.S. Briefs 712 (1992).
II I. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666 ("The international censure of international
abductions is further evidenced, according to respondent, by the United Nations Charter and the
Charter of the Organization of American States.").
112. Jd. at 667 .
113. Cf Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L.J. 2277, 2282 (1994) ("[I]nternational law can be used to supplement existing law. Here
the use of international law is apparently consistent with the decisions of the executive branches;
international law fills an area that domestic law has left blank"). Justice Blackmun later criticized
Alvarez-Machain for "ignor[ing] its first principles and constru[ing] the challenged treaty directly
contrary to the opinions of mankind." Justice Harry Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law
of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, I 04 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1994).
The Supreme Court's construction of the UN Refugee Convention in the Haitian refugee case,
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. !55 (1993), showed similar disregard for international
law as a substantive guide in treaty interpretation. See Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti
Paradigm " in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2416-19 (1994)
(describing the Court's failure to respect international law in Haitian Centers Council).
114. 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997).
115. ld. at 107.
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not ... be extradited by that Party to a third State." 116 Underpinning the
treaty's plain language were customary norms-codified in the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties-which
require that "a change in sovereignty brought about when one sovereign
state is ceded and becomes part of the territory of another preexisting
state ... generally terminates the effect of treaties of the predecessor state
with respect to the territory in question." 117
The district court accepted this construction of the statute and
released Lui on bail, but the First Circuit ordered Lui returned to
custody and cleared the way for his extradition to Hong Kong-and,
ultimately, to China. According to a majority of the three-judge panel,
the treaty should be construed in a manner that "produce[s] reciprocity
between, and expanded rights on behalf of, the signatories .... 'For that
reason, if a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the
rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the
more liberal construction is to be preferred. "' 118 Ignoring customary
international law, the court narrowed the Article XII limitation and
reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus.
The Vienna Convention rejects the nationalist presumption that treaty
parties draft international agreements on a tabula rasa. One country's
legal duty to respect another's territorial sovereignty does not evaporate,
the Convention suggests, simply because the two sign an extradition
agreement. Instead, the Convention presumes that states negotiate and
conclude agreements against the backdrop of their preexisting
obligations under customary international law just as U.S. courts
presume that Congress passes legislation against the backdrop of
domestic common law. To the extent that the Convention permits courts
to construe states' rights "liberally," Article 31 (3)( c) of the Vienna
Convention dictates that states' other international obligations mark the

116. /d. at 122 (citing Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, *12, as
amended June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., T.l.A.S. No. 12050, art. XII(l)(a)-(b)).
117. United States v. Kin-Hong, No. 97-1084, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7587, *33 (Stahl, J.,
dissenting) (citing the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 15
U.N. Doc. NCONF. 80/31 (1978), 72 AM . 1. INT'L L. 971 (1978)). The United States is not a
signatory to this Convention, it is nevertheless widely recognized to express the customary
international law on this subject. See id. at *33 n.IO (noting that "the Convention [on Succession]
is ... viewed as an authoritative statement of the rule governing the succession of states under
public international law"); MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1987) (noting that although the Convention on Succession "is not yet
in force ... many of its provisions codify the customary intemationallaw on the subject").
118. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 110 (quoting Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94
(1993), and United States v. Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1330 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993)).
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outer limits of this discretionary zone. 119

3.

Should Courts Always Defer to the Executive Branch?

A third salient distinction between the nationalist and internationalist
approaches is the degree of deference that each accords executive
interpretations of ambiguous treaties. In theory, U.S. courts "interpret
treaties for themselves." 120 In practice, however, judges rarely adopt
interpretations that conflict with the views expressed by the State
Department and other executive agencies. While not formally
"conclusive," the Supreme Court has held that "the meaning attributed
to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their
negotiation and implementation is entitled to great weight." 121
Over the last two decades, the Court's deference to executive treaty
interpretations has come to signify a virtual presumption of accuracy,
which opposing litigants may rebut only by furnishing exceptionally
strong counterevidence (e.g., proof that a proposed interpretation rests
on fundamentally faulty logic). 122 Alvarez-Machain demonstrates that
the Court will follow these executive interpretations even when treaty
partners provide conflicting representations regarding their own specific
intent and expectations. As Professor Bederman has observed, "Judicial
deference to the Executive's position is the single best predictor of
interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases." 123
The Supreme Court's extraordinary deference to executive agencies
in treaty cases represents a nationalist adaptation of a customary
principle common to both the nationalist and internationalist
approaches: the canon of "liberal interpretation." This general principle
119. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c). An apt analogy is the concept of "margin
of appreciation" in European Union law, which allows regional interpreters to interpret EU
treaties liberally, provided that these interpretations do not breach other relevant norms.
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976).
120. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §
326 ("Courts in the United States have final authority to interpret an international agreement for
purposes of applying it as law in the United States ... ").
121. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 457 U.S. at 184-85.
122. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1986).
123. David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 1015 (1994); see also Bush, supra note 8, at 956 (discussing three "choreographed steps" in
judicial treaty interpretation: "(1) acknowledging that deference to the political branches is the
prevailing rule; (2) refusing to defer in this specific case, noting that the leading statement on
deference to the political branches, Baker v. Carr, does not require it; and (3) affirming the
Executive Branch claims after looking at the case on its merits."). U.S. courts may not be unique
in their systematic bias toward national interests. See MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., THE
INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 259 (1967) ("[N]ational judges
appear to have voted for the position championed by their country about 80 percent of the time.").
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(applied expansively in Kin-Hong) declares that, in the absence of
affirmative treaty obligations, jus cogens norms, or customary
international law "[ r ]estrictions upon the independence of States
cannot. .. be presumed." 124 As the Permanent Court of International
Justice explained, "If the wording of a treaty provision is not clear, in
choosing between several admissible interpretations, the one which
involves the minimum obligations for the Parties should be adopted." 125
Thus, within certain limits, international law allows interpreters to adopt
treaty constructions that minimize the parties' contractual obligations. 126
In several cases, the Supreme Court has characterized this canon of
liberal construction as a presumption favoring expansive interpretations
of states' rights under treaties and disfavoring interpretations that
restrict state sovereignty. "Treaties are to be construed in a broad and
liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive
of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable of them,
the latter is to be preferred." 127 Viewed through a nationalist lens, the
decision to construe treaty provisions in a "broad and liberal spirit"
favors deference to executive agencies' reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous treaty provisions, since this approach inhibits courts from
burdening the United States with gratuitous international obligations.
While this nationalist approach has some intuitive appeal, it suffers
from two major flaws. First, construing the United States' rights
"liberally" often induces courts to restrict a treaty partner's rights under
international law. In Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Supreme Court
invoked the canon of "liberal construction" as a basis for construing the
United States' sovereign rights under the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty liberally (allowing cross-border abductions by U.S. law
enforcement). The Court devoted little attention, however, to the fact
that this "liberal" construction implied a correspondingly stingy
construction of Mexico's territorial rights. By deferring to the State
Department's interpretation, the Supreme Court sent a message to other
treaty partners that, in U.S . courts, some sovereign interests are more
sovereign than others.
124. S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk), 1927 P.C .I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). But see Martin A.
Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of
International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. lNT'L L. & POL'Y 559 (1996) (arguing that "the time has come to
reexamine" this approach).
125. Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 25 (Nov. 21).
126. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 85 (4th ed. 1996)
(describing the canon ofliberal interpretation in teleological terms).
127. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1923).
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Second, deference to "liberal" executive treaty interpretations may
prejudice private parties and other nation-states, which act in reliance
upon a treaty's objective meaning. A paradigmatic example is Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 128 In Haitian Centers Council, the
Supreme Court considered whether forced repatriations of Haitian
refugees apprehended in international waters by the United States Coast
Guard violated the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention). 129 Article 33(1) of the Refugee
Convention contains the following general prohibition:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. 130
Rather than read this provision at face value to proscribe the
refugees' "return" to Haiti, the Supreme Court deferred to the United
States' interpretation and construed the term "return" ("refouler")
narrowly to contain an express geographic limitation. The Court argued
that any attempt to apply this prohibition extraterritorially to persons
apprehended on the high seas would unjustifiably limit U.S.
sovereignty. Ironically, however, the Court's expansive reading of the
United States' sovereign rights under the Refugee Convention
significantly diminished the rights of the refugees themselves-the very
persons that the Convention was designed to protect. As Justice
Blackmun argued in a stinging dissent, this so-called "liberal
interpretation" undermined the Convention's core purpose by "driving"
the refugees "back to detention, abuse, and death." 131 Repatriating the
refugees may have served United States' immediate foreign-policy
interests, but it required a highly improbable construction of Article
33( 1) viewed in light of its "ordinary meaning" and "object and
purpose. "132
The Supreme Court's deference to executive agencies in treaty cases
draws most attention in political hot-button cases like Haitian Centers
Council and Alvarez-Machain, but it plays a powerful role in less
politically-sensitive cases as well. Most of the Supreme Court's treaty
128. 509 u.s. 155 (1993).
129. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. 6259,
6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176.
130. !d.
131. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 208.
132. !d. at 169, 191.
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cases over the last quarter-century have involved civil actions brought
under the Warsaw Convention, which governs carrier liability for
"bodily injur[ies]" incurred in the course of "international
transportation." 133 Unlike Haitian Centers Council and AlvarezMachain, these bread-and-butter Warsaw Convention cases are hardly
the political powder keg cases that test the judiciary's capacity to deal
impartial justice. Nevertheless, of the seven Warsaw Convention cases
that reached the Supreme Court over the last twenty years, the Supreme
Court accepted the government's position in every case but one. 134
Not surprisingly, the Vienna Convention rejects the nationalist
approach's extraordinarily deferential attitude toward executive treaty
interpretations. Although the Convention does not address the issue
directly, it prohibits courts from imposing any "special meaning" on
treaty terms unless Articles 31-33 "establishtJ that the parties so
intended." 135 Only those national instruments that are "accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty" fall within the
Vienna Convention framework. 136 "Subsequent agreement[s]" and
"subsequent [state] practice [with respect to] ... the application of [a]
treaty" are admissible only if they clearly establish the parties' shared
agreement. 137
Taken as a whole, these provisions suggest that courts should not
accord heightened deference to any particular state (including the home
forum) in treaty cases. International law might empower courts to
construe treaty provisions "liberally" where necessary to avoid
unreasonable restrictions on national sovereignty. It might also permit
U.S. courts to give executive treaty interpretations limited deference
according to agencies' unique expertise and their potential to further
transnational uniformity. Nevertheless, the Vienna Convention clearly
does not anticipate that courts will exercise this deference as liberally as

133. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. I, 49 Stat. 3000, 3014, T.S. No. 876 (note following 49 U.S.C. §
40105).
134. The only case in which the Rehnquist Court has rejected the United States' interpretation
of a treaty is Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989), where the Court found the
government's reasoning to be fundamentally logically defective. In all other cases-including the
other six Warsaw Convention cases-the Court adopted the government's position. El AI Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Dooley v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 524
U.S. 116 (1998); Zicherman v. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996); Eastern Airlines,
Inc., v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
135. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(4).
136. !d. art. 31(2)(b).
137. !d. art. 31(3)(a)-(b).
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many U.S. courts have done in the past; in fact, the Convention
implicitly cautions courts against exercising this discretion in a manner
that contradicts a treaty's purpose or undermines the proper symmetry
of rights and obligations between treaty partners.

C.

Surveying the Great Divide

As this part has shown, the nationalist and internationalist approaches
differ in three fundamental respects: First, although both the approaches
seek to effectuate parties' "shared expectations," the nationalist
approach places greater emphasis on extrinsic sources as evidence of
subjective state intent. Second, the Vienna Convention presumes that
international law informs states' expectations regarding their treaty
obligations, but the nationalist approach rejects this presumption. Third,
the nationalist approach accords "great weight" to the executive
agencies' treaty interpretations, while the internationalist approach
discourages courts from privileging a single treaty party's
uncorroborated ex post representations.
From an internationalist perspective, the nationalist canons applied in
cases like Kin-Hong, Alvarez-Machain, and Haitian Centers Council
epitomize the United States' dysfunctional internalization of its
international commitments. These decisions do not call into question
U.S. courts' competency to apply international treaty law so much as
they cast doubt on courts' commitment to international treaty law. While
the Rehnquist Court has not gone so far as to declare treaty
interpretation a nonjusticiable political question, its nationalist approach
effectively immunizes most executive treaty interpretations from legal
challenge. 138
Viewed from a nationalist perspective, however, the Supreme Court's
deference to executive agencies and its diminished respect for
international customary norms reflect the executive's superior expertise
and political accountability in foreign affairs. Minimal judicial
interference in domestic treaty compliance safeguards U.S. sovereignty
and prevents judges from compromising sensitive or (perhaps) secret
diplomatic understandings.
Of course, in the vast majority of cases, courts will likely arrive at
comparable outcomes by following either the nationalist approach or the
internationalist approach. As legal realists have demonstrated, formal
method is an imprecise gauge for predicting the outcome of specific

138. Cf Koh, supra note 113, at 2434-35 (describing this tendency in foreign affairs law
generally).
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cases. Indeed, even the Vienna Convention's drafters recognized that,
despite their efforts to standardize treaty interpretation through the
Vienna Convention, "[t]he interpretation of documents is to some extent
an art, not an exact science." 139
Nevertheless, while differences between the nationalist approach and
the Vienna Convention "should not be exaggerated" (as the Restatement
justly cautions), 140 the foregoing case studies suggest that differences
may, in fact, generate conflicting results in a significant set of cases. 141
As courts become more familiar with the Vienna Convention's
interpretive regime, this conflict is likely to intensify.
II.

THE NATIONALIST AND INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGMS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Before turning to the merits of the nationalist and internationalist
approaches, it may be useful to retrace the paths by which they
diverged. In theory, the principle that U.S. courts should derive treaty
canons from customary international law-a principle I will refer to as
the "internationalist paradigm"-has long enjoyed a dominant position
in U.S. treaty practice. For centuries, U.S. courts have recognized that
they must interpret treaties according to internationally authoritative
canons rather than fashion their own common law treaty canons-an
alternative I will call the "nationalist paradigm." Although
contemporary common law treaty canons differ from the Vienna
Convention's internationalist canons in certain respects, these
differences are not an inevitable outgrowth of U.S. constitutional or
statutory law. Instead, this part shows that the contemporary nationalist
tradition originally developed as a contingent internationalist response
to a global jurisprudential crisis.

A.

The Internationalist Paradigm: First Principles

Since the United States' inception, U.S. courts repeatedly have
rejected the proposition that parochial treaty canons should supplant
customary international canons. Instead, when domestic courts
139. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its 17th Session and
on its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 218, U.N. Doc. N6309/Rev.l.
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 325 n.4.
141. See BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 240 ("Now, more than ever, there is a conflict
between U.S. practice and more 'international' approaches to treaty interpretation.... This schism
in method has been well-documented, and judges in the United States are more frequently
realizing that the approach taken by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties may lead to
interpretive outcomes very different than those suggested by .. .litigants.").
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adjudicate cases with transnational elements, they become "court[s] of
all the nations of the world, because all persons, in every part of the
world, are concluded by [their] sentences." 142
The Framers clearly anticipated that the law of nations would play an
integral role in domestic law, by providing independent rules of
decision and clothing the Constitution's bare bones in flesh. John Jay,
the Supreme Court's first Chief Justice, noted that the country "had, by
taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the
law of nations." 143 Just as international law illuminates constitutional,
statutory, and common law adjudication, U.S. courts anticipated that the
law of nations would inform the treaty power's substantive scope and
practical operation. "The subject of treaties ... is to be determined by
the law of nations," the Supreme Court affirmed in 1796. 144 Decades
later, in Holden v. Joy, 145 the Court sharpened this point:
Express power is given to the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds
of the senators present concur, and inasmuch as the power is
given .. . it must be assumed that the framers of the Constitution
intended that it should extend to all those objects which in the
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper
subjects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the
nature of our government and the relations between States and
the United States. 146
Although the law of nations might not speak directly to all questions
regarding the "proper subject of negotiation and treaty," the Court
appreciated that it would furnish many rules of decision for judicial
application.
More important for present purposes, U.S. courts have long
recognized that international law not only circumscribes the treaty
power's scope but also provides the principles by which courts must
interpret treaties. 147 As Justice Story emphasized in 1817, "the law of
142. Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3 U.S. 54, 91 (1795); see also Rose v. Himely, 8
U.S. 241, 277 (1808) (defending the fundamental "principle" that "the law of nations is the law of
all tribunals in the society of nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all.").
143. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Da11.) 419,474 (1793).
144. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796).
145. 84 U.S. 211 (17 Wall.)(l872).
146. !d. at 242-43 (emphasis added); see also De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1890)
("That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of negotiation between
our government and the governments of other nations is clear.").
147. The law of treaties traditionally constituted a subdivision of the customary international
"law of states." Due to Americans' "disillusioning experience" under the Articles of
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nations is always to be consulted in the interpretation of treaties." 148
Chief Justice Jay expressly affirmed this principle at the celebrated 1849
trial of Gideon Henfield:
Whenever doubts and questions arise relative to the validity,
operation, or construction of treaties, or of any articles in them,
those doubts and questions must be settled according to the
maxims and principles of the law of nations applicable to the
case. 149
Because treaties operate on the international plane, municipal courts
must apply international interpretive canons "whenever doubts and
questions arise" in domestic treaty construction. Consistent with this
principle, U.S. courts traditionally identified and applied international
canons in resolving treaty-related disputes. Transcripts of oral
argument-themselves crowded with references to international treaty
canons-testify eloquently to the vital role that these canons played in
domestic courts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Courts
recognized that international treaty canons constituted a field of law
distinct from ordinary domestic public and private law that must be
ascertained by reference to international consensus. 150
In theory, courts' responsibility to apply customary international
treaty canons remains a cardinal rule in U.S. jurisprudence today.
Customary international treaty canons do not merely displace domestic
common law canons; they become authoritative federal rules of which

Confederation, the treaty power's international valence "was never out of mind in the days of the
Constitutional Convention." Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National
Law of the United States II, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 792, 821-22 (1953); see also Jay, supra note 242,
at 827 ("In its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised ... the law governing the relations
between states.").
148. The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227,246 (1817).
149. See THOMAS M. F RANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND SIMULATIONS 97 (1987) (quoting Chief
Justice Jay's opinion).
150. See, e.g., De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (arguing that because treaties
"are contracts between independent nations, in their construction, the words are to be taken in
their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations .... "); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419-20 ( 1886) (interpreting an extradition treaty against the background
of international law); The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) ("Like all the laws of
nations, [the law of the sea] rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of
force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally
accepted as a rule of conduct.. .. Of that fact, we think, we may take judicial notice."); Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 556 (1856) ("International law is founded in the opinions generally
received and acted on by civilized nations, and enforced by moral sanctions."); Shanks v. Dupont,
28 U.S. 242, 250 (1830) (distinguishing "rules of interpretation applicable to treaties between
independent states" from public-law and common law principles).
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courts must take judicial notice. 151 "The frame of reference in
interpreting treaties is naturally international and not domestic," Justice
Stevens has explained. "Construction of treaties yielding parochial
variations in their implementation are anathema to the raison d'etre of
treaties, and hence to the rules of construction applicable to them." 152
When U.S. courts preside over treaty cases, they truly become "courts
of all the nations of the world," participants in an ancient, international
judicial system. 153
In sum, U.S. courts have long ascribed to the internationalist
paradigm, treating international treaty law as U.S. treaty law.
International treaty canons are U.S. treaty canons. And, like other fields
of customary international law, "courts must interpret" international
treaty law "not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today." 154 Centuries of judicial practice confirm
that international treaty canons are "our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice." 155

B.

The International Crisis and the United States' Response

Given the internationalist paradigm's firm foundation in judicial
rhetoric, how is it that U.S. courts have retreated from the Vienna
Convention's internationalist treaty canons? Before the 1920s, the
notion that domestic courts should follow a unique nationalist approach
rather than apply customary international treaty canons (a proposition
151. SeeKer v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (suggesting that courts must take notice of
international law).
152. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262-63 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. See generally Jenny S. Martinez, The International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (outlining the governing dynamics of an international judicial system
composed of national, regional, and international tribunals).
154. Fihirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Filartiga] (citing
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796) (distinguishing the "ancient" law of nations from the
"modern" law of nations)). Scholars have developed numerous of theories to explain how
international law becomes U.S. law. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 110, at 49-51 (describing
three conventional explanations-transformation, adoption, and harmonization); Harold H.
Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of International Law in Federal Courts of the United
States, 26 AM. 1. INT'L L. 280 (1932) (describing five originalist theories); Douglas J. Sylvester,
International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. I, 10 (1999) ("The founders viewed the law of nations and
sovereignty as inextricably bound .... This understanding bound the country to honor and adopt
this law as an incident to sovereignty-without requiring any formal theory of incorporation.").
155. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Frankowska, supra note 16, at
307 ("The law of treaties binding in the United States is today what it has been for two
centuries--customary international law, penetrating the domestic legal order in an almost
invisible manner.").
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that some scholars take for granted today) would have seemed patently
absurd. 156 The contemporary nationalist paradigm apparently took root
in U.S. treaty law only in the early- to mid-twentieth century, apparently
reflecting new movements in political and legal theory. While a
thorough examination of the forces giving rise to this shift is beyond
this article's scope, it may be helpful to highlight a few general trends.
By the early decades of the twentieth century, even confirmed
idealists began to challenge the notion that international treaty law
represented a coherent, empirically grounded system of customary
norms. "There is, in fact whatever the names used in the books, no
system of international law-and still less, of course, a code," Sir Alfred
Zimmern concluded. "What is to be found in the treatises is simply a
collection of rules which, when looked at closely, appear to have been
thrown together, or to have been accumulated, almost at haphazard." 157
In an effort to set the liberal ideal in a more solid foundation, leading
publicists subjected international treaty law to more rigorous empirical
analysis but ultimately conceded that relatively few "customary"
principles evinced the requisite generality and determinacy. 158 By the
end of the 1920s, this skepticism encountered little resistance; few
commentators openly espoused the antiquated theory that customary
international law might provide judicially manageable canons for treaty
interpretation. J.L. Brierly, for example, argued that there were "no
technical rules in international law for the interpretation of treaties; [a
court's] objective can only be to give effect to the intention of the
parties as fully and fairly as possible." 159 Twenty years later, even the
United Nations itself-the preeminent advocate for the codification of
international treaty law-openly lamented that few areas of
international treaty law were entirely "free from doubt and, in some
cases, from confusion." 160
156. Bederman, supra note 123, at 30 n.76, 261 nn.970-71.
157. SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918-1935,
98 (1939).
158. See. e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 168 (1928) (challenging the existence of
"technical rules" of treaty interpretation); CHARLES G. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 331
(1924) (according international rules of treaty interpretation only "inchoate legal value"); AMOS
S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 445 (1927)
(arguing that "[t]he rules for the interpretation of treaties are derived from general jurisprudence"
but "form no part of International Law proper"); Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29
AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 944 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft] ("[T]he tendency among
modem writers ... has been to reduce rather than to extend the number of [customary] rules of
interpretation and to deny them the character of international law altogether.").
159. BRIERLY,supranote 158,at 168.
160. Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/I!Rev.l, at 52 (1948), cited in Richard D. Kearney and
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As international publicists began to challenge international treaty
law's generality and determinacy, on the domestic front the burgeoning
American legal realist movement provided a second potent challenge to
U.S. courts' application of international treaty law. Theorists such as
Jerome Frank, Karl Llewellyn, and Roscoe Pound denounced the
popular "theory that rules decide cases," arguing that legal thought
could not be divorced from moral and political discourse generally and
from a judge's idiosyncratic values and biases in particular. 161 New
insights into the logical indeterminacy of established rules, the
ambiguity of legal language, the problem of social and economic
change, the multiplicity and imprecision of precedents, and other
analytic difficulties augmented realists' skepticism toward formal
canons. 162 In Pound's words, "[T]he certainty attained by mechanical
application of fixed rules to human conduct has always been illusory." 163
Legal realism challenged customary treaty canons' legitimacy not
only by undermining their claim to customary status, but also by
questioning their ability to provide determinate, objective results. As a
substitute for formalistic rules, American scholars developed
innovative, process-oriented models for fostering international legal
order in a post-utopian world. For example, the New Haven School
pioneered by McDougal and Harold Lasswell counseled courts to
fashion "a more usable conception of international law" by recognizing
and accommodating "authority and control" rather than focusing
myopically on "rules and operations." 164 McDougal and Lasswell argued
that courts should forsake the quixotic quest for mechanistic treaty
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L 495,496 (1970). Note, however, that
even those commentators most skeptical "customary" treaty canons' existence nevertheless
implicitly recognized some rules as having universal application. For instance, the 1928 edition of
Oppenheim's celebrated treatise on international law argued that neither "customary nor
conventional rules of international law exist concerning the interpretation of treaties," but
proceeded to recommend a number of "rules of interpretation which recommend themselves,
because everybody agrees upon their suitability." L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 759-61
(Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928).
161. Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. I, 7 (1934); see
also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a
Realistic Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); see generally MORTON HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 193
(1992) (describing the Realists' challenge to the "claim that legal thought was separate and
autonomous from moral and political discourse" as "the most important legacy of Realism").
162. WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE
JUDICIA PROCESS 55-67 (1968).
163. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 71 ( 1954).
164. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 169 (1960) (reprinting 1959
article).

HeinOnline -- 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 469 2003-2004

470

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 44:2

canons and embrace flexible, process-oriented decision-making
strategies that allow judges to grapple with their decisions' broader
policy consequences. 165 If courts, not canons, decide particular cases, the
legitimacy of judicial decisions naturally turns on the legitimacy of the
substantive values and policies that animate a court's decision-making
process. Thus, the New Haven School's tum to normative interpretive
theories provided a framework for mediating between legal realism's
"rule-skepticism" and traditional "rule of law" values.
Like the American legal realists, political realists of the 1930s and
1940s such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau challenged the notion
that abstract rules could constrain judicial decision-making. Unlike the
legal realists, however, political realists dismissed the notion that arid
legal doctrines or decision-making processes could significantly
influence international relations. Rather, political realists argued that
international law inevitably served the interests of powerful nationstates by mirroring and sustaining the prevailing equilibrium of
power. 166
Believing that international stability depended upon political
calculation rather than legal legitimization, Carr denied that
international disputes could be resolved through adjudication rather than
diplomacy backed by force. 167 Morgenthau similarly rejected municipal
adjudication as a mechanism for resolving treaty disputes:
In the international field, it is the subjects of the law themselves
that not only legislate for themselves but are also the supreme
authority for interpreting and giving concrete meaning to their
own legislative enactments. They will naturally interpret and
apply the provisions of international law in the light of their
particular and divergent conceptions of the national interest.
They will naturally marshal them to the support of their
particular international policies and will thus destroy whatever
restraining power, applicable to all, these rules of international
law, despite their vagueness and ambiguity, might have
165. See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL ., INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967) (outlining a policy-oriented interpretive theory that emphasizes
the role of individual decision-makers in the resolution of global problems.).
166. Thus, the "bankruptcy of [international] utopianism resides" not merely in its failure to
constrain state actors, Carr argues, but also "in the exposure of its inabilities to provide any
absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs." EDWARD HALLETT
CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939, Ill (1940).
167. !d. at 178-80; see also MICHAEL JOSEPH SMITH, REALIST THOUGHT FROM WEBER TO
KISSINGER 82 (1986) (describing Carr's skepticism toward judicial resolution of treaty-related
disputes).
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possessed. 168
By Morgenthau's reasoning, international rules of treaty
interpretation-like treaties themselves-are of limited practical utility,
because they do not actually constrain powerful states from applying
treaties in self-serving ways. Courts might invoke internationalist
canons when this approach advances national interests, but not when
political expedience directs otherwise. 169
Thus, the early decades of the twentieth century witnessed a
weakening of the United States' internationalist paradigm as new
theoretical movements challenged customary international canons'
empirical underpinnings, efficacy, and moral and political legitimacy.
American jurists responded to this challenge in several ways.
First, legal academics and diplomats participated in a variety of
international conferences that endeavored to crystallize and codify
customary treaty canons in multilateral conventions. These early
codification efforts aimed to reconcile theory and practice by forging a
new global consensus around basic customary principles. These
conferences produced influential draft treaties such as the 1929 Havana
Convention 170 and the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention, 171 but no single
draft secured the collective approval of the international community.
Over time, however, this codification movement laid the groundwork
for the International Law Commission's more successful efforts in the
decades following the Second World War.
Second, U.S. courts filled the jurisprudential vacuum in international
treaty law with "general principles of law." 172 This approach tracked
Hersch Lauterpacht's famous prescription that courts should use general

168. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
PEACE 258 (2d ed. 1954). Morgenthau did not dispute the existence of an international legal
regime, "primitive" though it might be: "[T]o deny that international law exists at all as a system
of binding legal rules flies in the face of all the evidence .... To recognize that international law
exists is, however, not tantamount to asserting that it is .. .effective in regulating and restraining
the struggle for power on the international scene." /d. at 251.
169. Lauterpacht adopts this view in a later article, citing traditional canons "more out of
piety than conviction" while resolutely maintaining that international treaty canons are often
merely "the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means." Hersch
Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of
Treaties, 26 BRIT. YB. INT ' L L. 48, 49, 53 (1949).
170. Convention on Treaties, adopted by the Sixth International Conference of American
States at Havana, February 20, 1928, 29 AM . J. INT' L L. 1205 (Supp. 1935).
171. Harvard Draft, supra note 159.
172. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 48, art. 38 (recognizing "the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" as a legitimate source of international
law).
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principles of law to fill gaps between consensual norms. 173 Asserting
that "the legal nature of private law contracts and international law
treaties is essentially the same," Lauterpacht urged courts to restore
international order in treaty interpretation by rebuilding international
law on a foundation of neutral, transnational contract principles. 174
Courts should not apply this contract analogy indiscriminately,
however:
Nothing is more likely to obscure the identity of contracts and
treaties, or to bring into disrepute the recourse to analogy based
on recognition of such identity, than the indiscriminate appeal to
rules belonging exclusively to one system of private law and
owing their origin to special reasons of time and place. It is only
general principles of the private law of contracts, following with
logical necessity from the very conception of that institute of
law, which may, and must, be applied.175
Unfortunately, U.S. courts embraced Lauterpacht's private-law
analogy during the mid-twentieth century without heeding this
cautionary counsel. This approach stabilized U.S. treaty jurisprudence
domestically, but it also set U.S. treaty practice adrift from its
internationalist moorings.
Third, U.S. courts responded to the global crisis in international
treaty law by according heightened deference to the political branches'
interests and expertise. Prior to the 1930s, the Supreme Court explicitly
deferred to the executive branch only in the limited subset of extradition
treaties, and then only in cases involving the Secretary of State's
decision whether to extradite a criminal (on the theory that this
determination presented a political question). 176 In 1933, however, the
Court broadened its theory of deference by proclaiming a general rule
that courts should defer to executive treaty interpretations whenever

173. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
215-96 (Archon Books 1970) (1927); see also MARTI KOSKENIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF
NATIONS 364 (2001) (describing Lauterpacht' s intellectual leadership in this movement toward
general principles oflaw).
174. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 176,
at 176; see also STEPHEN HALEY ALLEN,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 70 ("Generally the meaning of a treaty is to be ascertained by the
same rules of construction and course of reasoning as is applied in the interpretation of private
contracts.").
175. !d. at 176-77.
176. See, e.g., Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S . 447, 476 (1913) (deferring to the executive
branch's decision to extradite an individual); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (I 902) (The
decisions of the Executive Department in matters of extradition, within its own sphere, and in
accordance with the Constitution, are not open to judicial revision).
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questions arise involving treaty interpretation. 177

C.

Treaty Interpretation after the United States 'Response

The most important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing
discussion is also the most obvious : The contemporary nationalist
paradigm in U.S. treaty interpretation is not an originalist paradigm, nor
is it an inevitable outgrowth of the United States' "dualist" legal system.
For nearly a century and a half after the founding, U.S. courts employed
a predominately monist treaty jurisprudence in which U.S. courts
invoked and applied international treaty canons as U.S. law.
If the Supreme Court's response to the skepticism and uncertainty of
the 1920s-1940s in fact represented a genuine "constitutional moment"
in U.S. treaty jurisprudence, this "moment" apparently went unnoticed
by the courts that masterminded the revolution. There is little evidence
that judges of the period intended to abandon the internationalist
paradigm for a nationalist paradigm or even recognized the growing
dissonance between U.S. common law canons and general international
practice. To the maximum extent possible, courts continued to rely upon
international consensus as a guide. Indeed, even during the heyday of
legal realism and political realism, courts regularly affirmed their duty
to decide treaty cases impartially according to internationalist canons. 178
With international treaty law in shambles, American courts simply had
no choice but to formulate new common law principles to aid them in
disposing of the treaty cases that came within their purview.
III.

EVALUATING THE INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGM

At the end of the day, the internationalist paradigm's survival will
undoubtedly depend less upon its historical pedigree than upon the
177. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933). Even in Factor, however, the
Court maintained that treaties should be construed "so as to effect the apparent intention of the
parties to secure equality and reciprocity between" treaty parties. /d. at 293 .
Deference to executive agencies also defused concerns that judicial treaty interpretation
constituted a nonjusticiable political question. See, e.g., TSUNE-CHI YO, THE INTERPRETATION
OF TREATIES 70-71 ( 1927) (arguing that if "judges of an arbitral tribunal should be given a
right.. .[to] apply[] rules of construction without sufficient evidence, they ... would be free even to
distort the issue of the most unnatural shapes, and cripple where they had sought only to adjust its
proportions according to their own arbitrary opinions."); cf Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 222
( 1962) (indicating that the lack of judicially manageable standards renders an issue a
nonjusticiable "political question").
178. See, e.g., Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653 (1946); State Tax Commission v. Gas Co.,
284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) ("As treaties are contracts between independent nations, their words are to
be taken in their ordinary meaning ' as understood in the public law of nations."').
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normative question lurking behind the scenes: Should U.S. courts
continue to conceptualize treaty interpretation through an
internationalist lens or should they pursue nationalist, common law
canons? While international relations scholars might approach this
question from a variety of perspectives, my focus here is somewhat
narrower: Is the Vienna Convention's internationalist approach
compatible with the United States' legal system? Are there compelling
legal justifications for shifting to the nationalist paradigm?
Tensions between the nationalist and internationalist paradigms in
U.S. treaty interpretation feed into broader scholarly debates in legal
academia over American exceptionalism in foreign affairs. Recently, the
nationalist paradigm has gained new adherents as revisionist scholars
such as Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, and John Yoo have reexamined, and have attempted to recast, domestic courts' traditional
role in transnational litigation. Flashpoints in the nationalist/
internationalist debate include the scope of the President's foreign
affairs powers, federal courts' competency to apply customary
international law, and the appropriate relationship between domestic
and international tribunals. Revisionists share a common set of
assumptions concerning the Constitution's allocation of foreign affairs
powers, the definitional attributes of state sovereignty, contemporary
international law's alleged "democratic deficit," and the superiority of
domestic jurisgenerative institutions vis-a-vis international institutions.
Thus, the Vienna Convention's contemporary vitality depends in no
small part on the force and accuracy of these revisionist critiques.

A.

Constitutional Concerns

Whether U.S. courts should follow the Vienna Convention or
nationalist common law canons naturally depends upon the approaches'
compatibility with domestic constitutional and statutory law. No federal
or state legislature has enacted uniform rules for treaty construction; 179
the only domestic text that limits courts' interpretive discretion is the
Constitution itself. Four provisions address the treaty power directly.
Article I, Section I 0 forbids states from engaging in independent treaty
making with foreign nations. 180 Article II, Section 2 provides that the
President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
179. Several American states have codified guidelines for judicial interpretation of state
legislation. E.g. , MINN. STAT. § 645 (2002); Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, I PA.
CONS. STAT.§§ 1921-28 (2003). The U.S. Code also codifies a number of interpretive principles.
See, e.g., I U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (providing instructions for construing various types of words).
180. U.S. CONST., art. I,§ 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty .... ").
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Senate to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur." 181 Article III, Section 2 extends "the judicial Power to . .. all
Treaties made, or which shall be made" pursuant to the Constitution and
laws of the United States. 182 Finally, the Supremacy Clause, Article VI,
Clause 2, declares treaties to be the " Supreme law of the land," which
binds all St!ites within the union. 183 Most objections to the Vienna
Convention turn on these four constitutional provisions . These
objections warrant careful scrutiny, since constitutional norms
supersede customary international law in the United States' "dualist"
system. Should the Vienna Convention's application violate the
Constitution, U.S . courts would have no choice but to modify or
abandon the Convention's internationalist approach.

1.

Advice and Consent

One possible constitutional objection to the Vienna Convention
concerns the Senate's authority to render "advice and consent" in the
ratification of treaties. Over the past two decades, few issues in U.S.
foreign affairs law have generated as much controversy as the Senate's
constitutional advice and consent responsibility. President Reagan's
1983 "Star Wars" speech, 184 in which he announced his intent to
reinterpret the 1972 Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM
TreatyY 85 and the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF Treaty), 186 provided the initial focal point for this debate. While an
exhaustive examination of this issue is beyond this Article's scope,
several points deserve consideration.
First, there can be little doubt that, in some circumstances, the Treaty
Clause may require domestic courts to construe treaties in a manner
inconsistent with the Vienna Convention. Consider, for example, the
Senate's ongoing practice of attaching reservations, declarations, and
understandings to treaties. Although understandings do not ordinarily
alter treaties' substantive content, 187 reservations and declarations often

181. U.S. CONST., art II, § 2, cl. 2.
182. U.S. CONST., art. Ill,§ 2, cl.l.
183. U.S. CONST., art. VI,§ I, cl. 2.
184. National Security: President Reagan ' s address to the Nation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 442 (Mar. 23, 1983).
185. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
186. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles, Dec. 8,
1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1459 (Dec. 14, 1987).
187. The State Department has defined an "understanding" as "a statement when it is not
intended to modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty in its international operation but is
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materially modify a treaty provision's meaning. In most cases, the
United States simultaneously concludes "a protocol of exchange" with
treaty partners-an auxiliary agreement that spells out the prospective
significance of any Senate reservations, declarations, or understandings
appended to the first treaty. 188 Occasionally, however, the United States
dispenses with additional diplomatic negotiations and simply attaches
reservations, declarations, and understandings without obtaining treaty
partners' express or implied consent. Under such circumstances, the
Vienna Convention's instruction that courts should consider only
materials accepted by both treaty partners would preclude judicial
consideration of Senate reservations and declarations. 189 Nevertheless,
because the Senate conditions its constitutionally required consent upon
these reservations and declarations, American courts bear a unique
constitutional obligation to honor these unilateral instruments. 190
Aside from official reservations, declarations, and understandings,
however, the Senate's constitutional role in domestic treaty
interpretation remains highly controversial. In the context of the
ABM/INF controversy, several schools of thought developed to explain
the Senate's constitutional role in treaty practice. Some scholars
analogized the Senate's authority in treaty ratification to the executive's
intended merely to clarify or explain or to deal with some matter incidental to the operation of the
treaty in a manner other than as a substantive reservation." MICHAEL J. GLENNON & THOMAS
FRANCK, 2 UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 16 ( 1980).
188. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 132 (1990).
189. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31-32.
190. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly
recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty"); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone
Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 351 (1945) (giving legal effect to a Senate treaty
amendment); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869)
("In this country ... the Federal Constitution declares [treaties] to be the law of the land.
If so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it,
must agree to it. But the Senate ... may modify or amend it, as was done with the treaty
under consideration.").
John Norton Moore has questioned the conventional wisdom that Senate reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs) bind domestic courts, on the ground that the Supremacy
Clause only makes "[t]reaties made, or which shall be made" the "supreme Law of the land, not
domestic conditions attached to treaties or ... separate legally binding Senate interpretations apart
from the treaty." John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the Constitution, and the Rule of
Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 193 (2001). The Restatement provides some support for Moore's
view. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 303, n.4 ("A condition imposed by the Senate that does not
seek to modify the treaty and is solely of domestic import, is not part of the treaty and hence does
not partake of its character as 'supreme law of the land."'). If accepted, Moore's challenge to
domestic RUDs would support my thesis that U .S. law does not prevent domestic courts from
applying the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, because a full exploration of this question is
beyond this Article's scope, I will simply assume for brevity's sake that RUDs fall within the
Supremacy Clause.
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veto power in the federal legislative process, arguing that courts should
not accord the Senate's subjective understanding of a treaty (as
evidenced in the ratification record) any deference. 191 Others reasoned
that the Senate cannot effectively "consent" to what it does not
understand; any treaty interpretation that conflicts with the Senate's
subjective original understanding would therefore lack the "consent"
necessary for Article-II legitimacy. 192 A third school contended that
courts should presume that the Senate consents to a treaty's
international meaning as defined by international treaty law. 193
To date, courts have offered only limited assistance in resolving this
debate. 194 No court has declared the Constitution requires coUrts to
consider Senate ratification in all cases. While courts occasionally
consult Senate ratification materials in order to clarify the Senate's
subjective intent, 195 they typically rationalize this maneuver by stressing
that Senate ratification materials are "useful" for clarifying the
executive's intent as the United States' representative in treaty
negotiations-not that the Constitution itself requires deference to
Senate ratification materials.
Strict adherence to the Senate's subjective understanding of treaty
provisions makes little sense from a pragmatic perspective. As one
commentator has cautioned, "[t]o require that the President meet both
the nation's international obligations and the passively-gained
understandings of the Senate would sometimes place the Executive in a
double bind. Nothing in the Constitution or its interpretive history
requires the President to be placed in that position." 196 Even assuming
191. E.g.. John C. Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (2001).
192. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The President Versus the Senate in Treaty Interpretation:
What's All the Fuss About?, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (1990).
193. E.g.. David A. Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of
Arms Control Treaties , 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1408-12 (1989).
194. Most of these cases address the President's authority to form international agreements
other than Article II treaties. See, e.g. , Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) ("[T]he
President may enter into certain binding agreements with foreign nations without complying with
the formalities required by the Treaty Clause of the Constitution .... "); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
195. See Detlev F. Vagts, Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 546
(1989) (identifying seven cases in which the Supreme Court has considered Senate ratification
materials).
196. Kenneth S. Gallant, American Treaties, International Law: Treaty Interpretation after
the Biden Condition, 21 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 1067, 1103 (1989); see also Malvina Halberstam, A
Treaty is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 63 (noting that this approach would mean that
"the President would have to review the whole pre-ratification record ... every time a question of
treaty interpretation arose, to see whether he could decipher any Senate understanding-explicit
or implicit-that would require him to take a particular position on the question.").
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arguendo that the Constitution requires deference to the Senate's
express reservations, declarations, and understandings, this
constitutional requirement would not excuse courts from following the
Vienna Convention when these conflicts are absent. Express Senate
reservations, declarations, and understandings would be rendered
superfluous if courts could bypass treaties' ordinary meaning by
privileging less formal expressions of Senate intent. In short, although
express reservations, declarations, and understandings may require
judicial deference, the Treaty Clause does not obligate courts to defer to
the Senate's informal interpretations of treaties rather than apply the
Vienna Convention's customary international canons.
2.

The Judicial Power and Article II

Several scholars have defended the nationalist paradigm on the
ground that the Constitution commits treaty interpretation primarily to
the executive branch rather than the judicial branch. Arguments for
executive supremacy have considerable intuitive appeal, since the
United States could not function effectively on the international plane
without executive institutions competent to negotiate and execute
international agreements. In theory, maximizing executive discretion
over domestic treaty practice augments the executive's capacity to
perform the United States' informal and secret international
commitments. Nevertheless, these arguments for heightened judicial
deference to executive treaty interpretations ultimately remain
unpersuasive, because they do not adequately account for the judiciary's
nonderogable constitutional role.
Advocates for judicial deference in treaty interpretation typically
contend that the Constitution vests foreign affairs power primarily in the
executive branch. John Yoo, for example, has argued that the Treaty
Clause's location within Article II rather than Article III reflects the
Framers' understanding of the treaty power as a fundamentally
executive power. All matters respecting the functioning of
treaties-their formation, execution, enforcement, and
interpretation-fall within Article II's general endowment of authority
to the executive branch. This constitutional allocation of interpretive
power also finds expression in the Vesting Clause, which declares that
all unenumerated executive powers-including, Y oo suggests, the treaty
power-reside within the executive branch. 197
197. John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens ofDelegation, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1305, 1309 (2002) (citing U.S. CONST., art. II,§ 1, cl. 1).
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Y oo argues further that "treaty interpretation has to rest with the
President due to his management of foreign policy and his constitutional
control over the interpretation of international law on behalf of the
United States .... The President must constantly interpret international
law in the course of conducting our day-to-day foreign affairs." 198 In
Yoo's opinion, the President's constitutional competency to execute
treaties entails the corresponding competency to interpret treaties on the
United States' behalf. Given the elusive ontology of party intent, the
power to bind the United States to particular treaty interpretations must
rest with the branch that has the greatest political accountability and the
most intimate acquaintance with treatymakers' original agreement. 199
Although executive branch's constitutional authority to "take Care
that the Laws are faithfully executed"200 undoubtedly extends to treaties
with foreign nations, as Y oo suggests, this authority to interpret treaties
for execution purposes does not justify executive supremacy in treaty
interpretation. Federal legislation provides the obvious analogue in U.S.
law: No one seriously challenges the executive's competence to
interpret federal statutes since this interpretive authority falls within the
President's authority to administer the public implementation of federal
law. Yet this executive competence does not utterly preempt the
judiciary's final authority "to say what the law is." 201 On the contrary,
courts consistently have defended the constitutional grundnorm that
Article-III judges, rather than elected officers or appointed bureaucrats,
have the final say when questions arise involving the interpretation of
self-executing treaties. 202
As with federal legislation, all three branches of government play
important constitutional roles in treaty formation and internalization.
Two-thirds of the Senate must "concur" before treaties negotiated by the
executive become U.S. law. 203 Once the Senate tenders its consent, a

198. Jd. at 1310. ln this respect, Yoo 's thesis echoes Professor W. Michael Reisman's earlier
observation in the context of the ABMIIMF debate: "The issue is simply the competence to
perform treaties internationally. If you cannot interpret, you cannot perform ." W. Michael
Reisman, Necessary and Proper: Executive Competence To Interpret Treaties, IS YALE J. INT'L
L. 316,326 (1990).
199. Yoo, supra note 196, at 881. Yoo does not explain, however, why party intent should be
considered more elusive in the treaty context than in the context of private contracts.
200. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 3.
201. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
202. E.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)
("[T]he courts have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements ... and we cannot
shirk this responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones.").
203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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treaty becomes the "supreme Law of the Land." 204 The executive's
constitutional duty to see that treaties are "faithfully executed" does not
give executive agencies unbounded interpretive discretion over treaties;
on the contrary, it obligates agencies to conform their actions to judicial
decisions. 205 "[T]he judicial power extends "to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under [self-executing] Treaties," just as it extends to
cases arising under the Constitution and "the Laws of the United
States,"206 and courts possess the same supreme interpretive authority
with respect to U.S. treaties that they possess in cases involving federal
constitutional and statutory law. Treaties "partake of the nature of
municipal law," as the Supreme Court stressed in The Head Money
Cases/ 07 meaning that, for interpretation purposes, "[t]he Constitution
ofthe United States places such provisions as these in the same category
as other laws of Congress."208
Acknowledging courts' constitutional role in U.S. treaty
interpretation, Professor Curtis Bradley offers a somewhat more
nuanced defense of the nationalist paradigm. 209 According to Bradley,
the Supreme Court's deference to executive treaty interpretations
closely parallels the Chevron doctrine in administrative law: 210 courts
actually defer to executive agencies' interpretations of ambiguous
treaties based upon an implicit presumption that "United States
treatymakers [i.e., the President and Senate] ... delegate[] interpretive
power to the executive branch because of its special expertise in foreign
affairs." 211 Tracking Chevron, courts do not defer to an executive
agency's treaty interpretation if the treaty's plain language resolves the
issue, if the interpretation is patently unreasonable, or if the interpreting
agency is not itself responsible for administering the treaty. 212
204. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I, cl. 2.
205. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1263, 1271 (2002) ("As part of the law of the land, [self-executing treaties] must also fall
within the executive's obligation in Article II, Section 3 to 'take care' that the 'Laws' are
faithfully executed."); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L.
REV. 649, 655 (2000) (arguing that self-executing treaties are "part of the 'Laws' referred to in
Article II's Take Care Clause").
206. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
207. 112 u.s. 580,598 (1884).
208. !d.
209. Bradley, supra note 213.
210. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(suggesting that courts should ordinarily defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutes).
211. Bradley, supra note 209, at 702; see also BEDERMAN, supra note 78, at 169 n.577, 303
n.l178 (200 I) (analogizing judicial deference to executive agencies in treaty cases to Chevron).
212. Bradley, supra note 213, at 703.
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Viewed from a nationalist perspective, Bradley's Chevron paradigm
effectively safeguards the Constitution's checks and balances. To the
extent that treaties are ambiguous, the Chevron paradigm presumes that
the Senate delegates interpretive discretion to executive agencies (unless
such delegation seems unreasonable under the circumstances), 213
maximizing national sovereignty to the extent reasonable under the
relevant treaty. If the executive branch's interpretation exceeds the
Senate's intended delegation of authority or violates the Senate's actual
expectations, Congress may effectively overrule the President's treaty
interpretation by enacting superceding legislation.
Bradley's Chevron paradigm is far less compelling, however, when
viewed from an internationalist perspective. Granting policymaking
discretion to executive agencies may cause a single, self-executing
treaty to have fundamentally different meanings under international and
domestic law. Chevron deference thus draws U.S. treaty jurisprudence
into conflict with international treaty law's foundational principle, pacta
sunt servanda. 214
Bradley's Chevron analogy also glosses over the basic principle that
U.S. treatymakers cannot unilaterally delegate interpretive authority to
executive agencies, because these institutions lack treaty-making
authority without the express consent of an Indian tribe, foreign
sovereign, or other international entity. Far from compelling courts to
defer to executive treaty interpretations, the Constitution arguably
restricts U.S. treatymakers' authority to render binding treaty
interpretations by making judicial interpretation the rule and
congressional override of judicial interpretations the exception. Unless
treaty parties clearly communicate their intent to delegate interpretive
power to municipal authorities, U .S. courts should not impede
international uniformity by according the executive's subjective treaty
interpretations Chevron deference.
Of course, courts need not (and should not) disregard executive treaty
interpretations entirely. Executive treaty interpretations may merit great
weight based upon a variety of factors, including the cogency of the
213. !d. at 703-04 ("Issues such as the effect and validity of a Senate reservation and whether
a treaty overrides earlier federal legislation are issues not likely to be delegated by the Senate to
the executive branch .... [C]ourts have not tended to give Chevron-like deference to the executive
branch on those issues.").
214. As discussed previously, U.S. courts have overwhelmingly defended the internationalist
paradigm, affirming that courts' primary duty in treaty cases is to honor States' collective intent
rather than the United States' unilateral interests. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399
(1985) ("[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent
with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.").
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agency's reasoning, the agency's relevant expertise, and evidence that
the United States' treaty partners have ratified the agency's
interpretation. A particularly important factor in a court's deference
assessment is the extent to which the agency's proposed interpretation
will further international legal order by safeguarding public and private
reliance and by enhancing the law's coherence, predictability, and
uniformity. 215 Applying persuasiveness deference, rather than Chevron
deference, decreases the likelihood that domestic courts will adopt selfserving treaty interpretations that violate treaty partners' reasonable
expectations and the United States' own international obligations. 216

3.

Customary International Law and the Separation of Powers

A third potential objection to the Viemia Convention's interpretive
regime might be formulated thus: If U.S. courts may apply the Vienna
Convention's treaty-interpretation principles as customary international
law, doesn't this undermine the Treaty Clause by licensing courts to
internalize treaties that the political branches have rejected?
Viewed from a nationalist perspective, courts that apply unratified
multilateral conventions violate the Constitution's delicate separation of
powers. Since "the nature of the treaty/customary law distinction may
determine who makes the law, who applies the law, and who is subject
to it," courts' discretion to identify and apply customary international
law arguably effects a judicial coup d'etat.211 To escape potential
separation-of-powers conflicts, nationalists argue that courts should not
allow unratified treaties to slip in the back door through customary
international law. Senator Jesse Helms, for example, has analogized the
Vienna Convention's domestic effect to that of "a dead cat lying on
somebody's doorstep .... [U]ntil the proposed convention is brought
before the Senate for consideration in executive session .. .its provisions
have no relevance whatsoever. .. and ought to be ignored."218
Although the distinction may be somewhat slippery in practice, the
power to identify customary international law should not be mistaken
for an arbitrary power to override the political branches' foreign-policy
215. In determining whether to defer to executive treaty interpretations, courts regularly
consult the positions adopted by the United States' treaty partners. See, e.g., El AI Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 175-76 n.16 (1999) (considering decisions of New
Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom).
216. For more detailed critiques of Bradley's thesis, see Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron
Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE L.J. 1927 (2003), and Van Alstine, supra note
205, at 1298-1302.
217. Chodosh, supra note 58, at 990-91.
218. 134 CONG.REC. Ll1460 (1988).
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determinations. As Professor Henkin has observed, "courts do not create
but rather find international law, generally by examining the practices
and attitudes of foreign states. Even the practices and attitudes of the
United States that contribute to international law do not emanate from
and respond to life in this society, as does the common law." 219 Because
courts identify customary international law by reference to opinio juris
and state practice, their discretion to internalize provisions from
multilateral treaties is relatively slight. 220 More importantly, separationof-powers concerns are particularly weak in the treaty-interpretation
context, because the Constitution grants federal courts authority to
develop common law canons even in the absence of authoritative
international canons. Rather than expand their own power to the
political branches' prejudice, federal courts arguably cabin their own
discretion by applying the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework.
The Supreme Court outlined the principles that govern U.S. courts'
incorporation of customary international law in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, a case involving the Cuban government's
expropriation of property owned by a U.S. corporation. 221 According to
Sabbatino, domestic judicial relief is restricted by the common law "act
of state" doctrine, which declares that "[ e]very sovereign State is bound
to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." 222 Although "the
Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine," the Court
explained, the principle that courts should ordinarily honor the actions
of other nation-states nevertheless has important '"constitutional'
underpinnings" 223 :
It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement
particular kinds of decisions in the area of international
219. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987).
220. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV.
1824, 1853 (1998) ("When construing customary international law, federal courts arguably
exercise less judicial discretion than when making other kinds of federal common law, as their
task is not to create rules willy-nilly, but rather to discern rules of decision from an existing
corpus of customary international law rules."). But see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate
Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 396 (2002) (challenging the
proposition that customary international law is highly determinate).
221. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
222. /d. at 416 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
223. !d. at 423.
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relations.... If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision
binding on federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither
international law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality
depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs. 224
Significantly, Justice Harlan's majority opinion does not portray the
act of state doctrine as a constitutional requirement that trumps
customary international norms in all cases; instead, the doctrine's
"vitality" turns upon its capacity to safeguard the proper distribution of
powers between the judiciary and the political branches. This
constitutional allocation of authority depends, in tum, upon the clarity
and universality of the customary norm under scrutiny:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or

consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of
an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice. 225
As Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks have observed, Justice Harlan's
opinion establishes a "sliding scale" for determining the justiciability of
customary international norms. 226 Where international law is clear and
international consensus (i.e., state practice and opinio juris) sufficiently
strong, courts must apply international law rather than develop
independent principles themselves. On the other hand, where an
224. !d. at 427-28.
225. !d. at 428. In addition to Sabbatino's generality and determinacy prongs, the Court also
suggests a third consideration: "It is also evident that some aspects of international law touch
much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the implications of an
issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political
branches." !d. As I have argued, international consensus regarding the Vienna Convention's
customary status, combined with the political branches' acceptance of the Vienna Convention as
an authoritative guide to customary international law, render such concerns relatively
unproblematic. Assertions that the Vienna Convention's interpretive regime might
"touch ... sharply on national nerves" in some individual cases are not really arguments against the
Vienna Convention itself but rather against judicial treaty interpretation as a whole (i.e., that
courts should defer to the executive in politically sensitive cases). !d.
226. Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga 's Firm Footing, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463,
482 (1997); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Techtonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990) (commenting that "in Sabbatino" the Court "suggested that a sort of balancing
approach could be applied" to "the validity of the act of a foreign sovereign within its own
territory").
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international norm remains inchoate or international consensus
uncertain, courts must leave the norm's refinement and enforcement to
the political branches. Thus, Sabbatino's sliding scale prevents courts
from unreasonably restricting the political branches' foreign policy
discretion, but also respects the fundamental principle that states'
responsibility to comply with customary international law increases as
international consensus develops as to the law's content. 227
In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court argued that the norm against
expropriation of foreign property had not achieved sufficient
international consensus to overcome separation-of-powers concerns.
Nevertheless, the Court clearly anticipated that future courts would
apply customary international law in other settings where the law's
clarity and consensus were sufficiently great. Since Sabbatino, federal
courts have employed Sabbatino's sliding scale in a variety of settings
as the authoritative metric for determining customary international law's
justiciability. The leading precedent in this area is the Second Circuit's
groundbreaking 1980 decision, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 228 which
established that noncitizens may bring civil actions in U.S. courts under
the United States' Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to punish
international human-rights violations. 229
In Filartiga, a Paraguayan national sued a Paraguayan official for
committing acts of torture and wrongful death in violation of

227. See James Anaya, Customary International Law, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 41, 43
(1998) (describing this principle in the context of international human rights norms). In Sabbatino
itself, the Supreme Court found a lack of international consensus with respect to the alleged norm
against expropriations of foreign property. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 ("There are few if any
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens."). Given this alleged absence of international
consensus, judicial application of an inchoate norm against expropriations of foreign property
would constitute an impermissible encroachment on the executive's foreign-affairs power:
When articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the
Executive Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for
the community of nations and protective of national concerns.
!d. at 432-33. Should courts expand or contract customary norms notwithstanding conflicting
State practice and opinio juris, this would significantly impede the Executive's ability to advocate
understandings of emerging customary norms that promote U.S. interests. As the Sabbatino Court
justly cautioned, "the possibility of conflict between the Judicial and Executive Branches [in such
cases] could hardly be avoided." !d. at 433. Naturally, the distinction between activist
"progressive development" and conservative "application" of preexisting standards is ambiguous
at best. Sabbatino's sliding scale reflects the variegated spectrum between these ideals.
228. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.")
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international covenants, declarations, and practices, which he alleged
constituted "the customary international law of human rights and the
law of nations."23° Finding the plaintiff to have a colorable claim under
the A TCA, the Second Circuit agreed that the international norm
prohibiting torture was of sufficient generality to warrant judicial
application. "[T]here are few, if any, issues in international law today,"
the court concluded, "on which opinion seems to be so united as the
limitations on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody."231
As evidence of this global consensus, the court noted that the
prohibition against official torture had "become part of customary
international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. " 232 Other international accords such as
the UN Charter33 and the UN Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture234 also witnessed the norm's
customary status. In light of these findings, the Second Circuit
concluded that the international norm prohibiting official torture had
attained sufficient international acceptance to merit judicial application.
Less heralded than the Second Circuit's generality finding, but
equally important to the court's ultimate decision, was the second prong
of Sa b bat in o 's balancing test-the determinacy requirement.
Considered in the abstract, the international norm against torture might
seem to be riddled with practical uncertainties. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit
reached precisely this conclusion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
when it determined that the torture prohibition's applicability to nonstate actors had yet to achieve the broad international consensus
necessary for domestic judicial enforcement. 235 The determinacy prong
proved far less problematic in Filartiga, however, for two reasons: First,
the complaint involved allegations of official torture-an offense falling
squarely within the customary norm's core traditional meaning. Second,
230. 630 F.2d at 879.
231. !d. at 881.
232. G.A.R. 217 (III)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. I, at 71 (1948) (stating that "no one shall
be subjected to torture").
233. U.N. CHARTER art. 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ... the United Nations
shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all .... "), art. 56 ("All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.").
234. G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N.Doc. A/10034
(1975).
235. 726 F.2d 774, 792 (1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing the Sabbatino test but fmding
the "degree of 'codification or consensus' ... too slight"); id. at 805 (Bork, J., concurring)
("Adjudication ... would require the analysis of international legal principles that are anything but
clearly defined .... ").
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binding international declarations provided clear support for the torture
prohibition's applicability to the acts considered in Filartiga. As the
court's opinion observed, "[t]hese U.N. declarations [prohibiting official
torture] are significant because they specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption,
' [m ]embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human
rights they promised in the Charter to promote. "' 236 Because the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights specifically enumerated official
torture as a human-rights violation, the Second Circuit concluded that
the norm had attained sufficient determinacy to merit domestic judicial
application. Indeed, confronted with the norm's codification in these
and other "international conventions and declarations," even Judge
Robert H. Bork conceded in Tel-Oren that "the proscription of official
torture" is "'clear and unambiguous. "'237
Both Filartiga and Tel-Oren demonstrate that multilateral treaties
with quasi-universal membership not only provide evidence that state
practice and opinio juris have attained sufficient generality for judicial
application, but also clarify customary norms' content "with great[er]
precision." Thus, after norms have been codified and affirmed by
international consensus, individual nation-states ordinarily can no
longer contend that the codified customary norms lack sufficient
determinacy for principled judicial application. 238 By promoting the
clarity of customary international law, multilateral conventions like the
Vienna Convention defuse separation-of-powers concerns and thereby
increase courts' constitutional responsibility to apply customary
international law.
Under Sabbatino's sliding scale, the Vienna Convention's customary
international canons would seem ideally suited for application in U.S.
courts. Just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provided the
clarity and specificity necessary for the Second Circuit's Filartiga
decision, numerous state and federal courts have recognized that
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention possess the normative clarity
and specificity necessary for application as customary international
law. 239 Admittedly, the Convention's flexible interpretive guidelines
236. Filcirtiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (quoting Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents
on Human Rights , in The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission
(Commission to Study the Organization of Peace ed. 1968)).
237. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 819-20 (Bork, J., concurring).
238. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 , 965 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (accepting
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone established by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea-an instrument the United States has yet to ratify).
239. See notes and text accompanying supra note 87.
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permit municipal judges to exercise considerable discretion (as would
any reasonably effective system). But it would be difficult to argue that
these guidelines do not lend themselves to principled judicial
application. On the contrary, the Vienna Convention's detractors
typically criticize Articles 31-33 for being rather too rigid and specific.
By any reasonable standard, the Vienna Convention's international
canons clearly satisfy Sabbatino 's generality and determinacy
requirements for application in U.S. courts. 240
Of course, separation-of-powers objections such as these often veil
deeper concerns about the so-called "democratic deficit" in customary
international law generally. From a nationalist perspective, judicial
incorporation of unratified multilateral conventions privileges
international consensus over domestic, democratic processes. Yet
concerns about the democratic legitimacy of customary international
law have little traction in the treaty-interpretation context. All available
evidence indicates that Congress and the executive branch fully accept
the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework as customary
international law. The State Department has consistently recognized that
Articles 31-33 represent an authoritative guide to customary
international canons of treaty interpretation, and the Foreign Relations
Committee's ratification record contains no significant challenge to this
determination. Applying the Vienna Convention's customary
international canons does not weaken the political branches' control
over the United States' treaty obligations; it simply allows judges to
apply a body of law that the political branches already accept. Thus,
even assuming that customary international law's domestic legitimacy
turns upon the consent of U.S. foreign policymakers, the Vienna
Convention's applicability remains unimpeached. 241

240. In addition to the Sabbatino analysis, Congress's capacity to override judicial
internalization of customary international law also cuts against nationalist concerns regarding
judicial incorporation of the Vienna Convention. As Justice Bradley explained in The
Lottawanna, customary international law has force in domestic courts only insofar as Congress
permits. 88 U.S. (2 I Wall) 558, 577 (1874). With the exception of nonderogable jus co gens
norms, Congress may override customary international law-including Articles 31-33 of the
Vienna Convention-if it chooses to exercise this power. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39
(1932) (describing the Congress's power to preempt international maritime law as being "beyond
dispute"); Dickinson, supra note 14 7, at 810-11.
241. My own view is that the very nature of customary international law precludes
disproportionate deference to the executive and legislative branches. As the Supreme Court
explained in Rose v. Hime/y, "the law of nations is the law of all tribunals in the society of
nations, and is supposed to be equally understood by all." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 277 (1808).

HeinOnline -- 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 488 2003-2004

2004]

B.

THE VIENNA CONVENTION

489

Customary Treaty Canons as Common Law

Aside from the foregoing constitutional concerns, the Vienna
Convention's incomplete internalization into U.S. law might reflect
popular uncertainty regarding the international treaty canons'
jurisprudential status. The principle that "international law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice"
has formed a cornerstone of U.S. jurisprudence since the earliest days of
the American republic. 242 But courts have yet to define precisely why
international law is part of our law and how they should ascertain and
administer its commands. "Treaties and the laws of the United States are
proclaimed by the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land,"
observes Maria Frankowska. "The Constitution is silent, however, on
the status of customary international law within the U.S . legal
system."243 As principles of international custom, the legitimacy of the
Vienna Convention's interpretive canons depends, in large part, upon
customary international law's general legitimacy.
Over the last several years, customary international law's status
within U.S . law has become a veritable battleground for competing
visions of the United States' interrelationship with the international
community. On one side of the battle line, internationalist scholars have
defended the orthodox view that customary international law enters
domestic law as a strain of federal common law. 244 Marshaled against
this mainstream position is an emerging vanguard of revisionist scholars
who contend that the Supreme Court's landmark decision, Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins / 45 utterly abolishes federal courts' law-generative
authority-including the competence to identify applicable rules of
customary international law. 246 According to revisionists, the authority
242. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For excellent discussions of the law of
nations' role in early American life, see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 6-7 ( 1996), and Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American
Law, 42 V AND. L. REv . 819 (1989).
243. Frankowska, supra note 16, at 388.
244. E.g., id. at 388 & n.524 ; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 231, at 468-69; Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REv. 1824 (1998); Jordan J. Paust,
Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties are Law of the United States, 20 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 301 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV . 371 (1997); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv.
393 (1997).
245. 304
64 (1938).
246. E.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, Critique, supra note 52; Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith,
The Current Illegitimacy of Customary International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation]; Ernest A. Young,
Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 396 (2002)

u.s.
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to articulate norms of customary international law passed to state courts
after Erie. The stakes in this skirmish are high, since state primacy over
customary international law would jeopardize federal human rights
litigation under the ATCA. 247
Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the revisionists' challenge
to traditional customary international law, this critique clearly has no
bearing upon customary international treaty canons' legitimacy. The
Constitution itself commits stewardship over federal treaty canons to the
federal judiciary. Two elementary principles of federal jurisdiction
support this understanding. First, even after Erie, federal courts retain
the authority to develop common law rules where "necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests."248 The obvious need for national uniformity
in foreign relations dictates that the authority to prescribe binding
principles of treaty construction should vest, for domestic supremacy
purposes, in federal courts alone. "[U]nder the national government,
treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will
always be ... executed in the same manner," John Jay explained in
Federalist No. 3, "whereas, adjudications on the same points and
questions in thirteen States ... will not always accord or be consistent." 249
Second and more important, federal courts retain supreme authority
over domestic treaty canons by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, which
proclaims that all "Treaties"-like all federal statutes-are "supreme
Law of the Land." 250 Pursuant to this provision, federal courts wield the
same supreme authority over treaty interpretation that they wield with
respect to the interpretation of the federal constitution and federal
statutes. This principle finds support in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court to review decisions of
state courts where the exercise was "repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States"251 In the United States, treaty
interpretation is a question of federal law over which federal courts,
rather than state courts, are the final custodians. 252
(challenging the proposition that customary international law is highly determinate).
247. Bradley & Goldsmith, Human Rights Litigation, supra note 253.
248. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.1 at 336 (2d ed. 1994) (quoting
Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
249. THE FEDERALIST NO.3, at 22 (John Jay) (I Bourne ed. 1901).
250. U.S. CONST. art. Vl, cl. 2. Federal district courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions
arising under the ... treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
251. 28 u.s.c. § 1257.
252. One important implication arising from this analysis is the principle that states lack
authority to develop canons of treaty interpretation inconsistent with those adopted by federal
courts.
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Customary Treaty Canons and U.S. Foreign Policy

Lastly, conventional wisdom suggests that many international norms
address themselves exclusively to the political branches without
creating judicially enforceable rights. Some of these norms are thought
to operate on the "horizontal" level between nation-states, but are not
considered to have legal force in municipal courts. Drawing upon this
classical "horizontal" paradigm of international law, some
commentators suggest that the Vienna Convention's interpretive canons
address themselves exclusively to the political branches, leaving
municipal courts free to develop alternative regimes.
Even if many customary international norms create affirmative duties
only for the political branches, this restriction clearly does not extend to
international treaty canons. The Constitution vests supreme authority
over treaty interpretation in the federal judiciary, and the judiciary-not
the President or Congress-bears the final responsibility for ensuring
that the United States interprets self-executing treaties in good faith.
Admittedly, some treaties that do not give rise to causes of action in
U.S. courts (i.e., non-self-executing treaties) may address themselves
exclusively to the political branches, leaving the executive and
legislative branches to monitor the United States' performance without
judicial interference. However, the determination whether a treaty is
self-executing or non-self-executing is itself a question for judiciary
resolution to which international treaty canons naturally apply. 253 Courts
may respect the political branches' interpretive decisions when treaty
parties commit agreements exclusively to the political branches'
discretion, but courts cannot disregard customary treaty canons in
deciding cases properly before them without undermining their own
legitimacy.
A related justification for judicial deference to executive and
legislative treaty interpretations focuses upon the political branches'
"sovereign" power to denounce or breach treaty obligations on the
United States' behalf. Professor Henkin describes this sovereign power
thus:
[P]resumably the President can exercise [the sovereign] power
for the United States, acting under one of his explicit powers or
under authority he derives from the powers of the United States
inherent in its sovereignty. If so, the fact that an action of the
253. In practice, courts apply a variety of tests-both objective and subjective-to determine
whether treaties are self-executing or non-self-executing. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four
Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697 (1995).
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President puts the United States in violation of international law,
however deplorable that be, does not, ipso facto, render that
action a violation of the Constitution. 254
In the United States' dualist system, courts cannot compel the
political branches to perform the nation's treaty obligations. Although
the United States may suffer political or economic reprisals for violating
its international agreements, such violations do not constitute
infringement of the Constitution or laws of the United States. On the
other hand, the executive branch's "sovereign" authority to breach or
terminate treaties does not give executive agencies a legal right to
interpret self-executing treaties contrary to the Vienna Convention's
customary canons. The United States may denounce or terminate its
treaty obligations, but the customary international principles that govern
treaty interpretation cannot be denounced or abrogated unilaterally. 255 In
short, treaty interpretation is not a "political question" necessitating
judicial abstention.
IV.

REVITALIZING THE INTERNATIONALIST PARADIGM

The nationalist concerns I have described in the preceding discussion
continue to impede the Vienna Convention's internalization into U.S.
law. Although international relations theorists might challenge the
internationalist paradigm on policy grounds, the preceding discussion
suggests that the paradigm's doctrinal underpinnings remain sound. The
Vienna Convention key interpretive guidelines are not, in fact,
inconsistent with U.S. constitutional or customary international law.
The Constitution imposes few categorical restraints on courts'
methodology for interpreting international agreements; 256 aside from the
254. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 236 (1996)
(citation omitted).
255. As Justice Iredell
declared in 1792, "The law of nations .. .is ... enforced ... by the
municipal law; which ... may ... facilitate or improve the execution of its decisions ... provided the
great universal law remains unaltered." Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160, 162 (1792)
(second emphasis added). For contemporary commentary discussing this principle, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III, intro
n.2 (Tentative Draft No.6, 1985) (acknowledging that the international law of treaties is a part of
foreign relations law of the United States); O'CONNELL, supra note 105 at 264-65; Frankowska,
supra note 16, at 306 (footnote omitted) ("There is ample evidence that U.S. courts apply rules of
international law when interpreting treaties."); id. at 307 (footnote omitted) ("The law of treaties
binding in the United States is today what it has been for two centuries-customary international
law .... Since its rules are applied only in conjunction with a treaty, actual reliance on the law of
treaties by the courts is not always properly acknowledged.").
256. See Gallant, supra note 196, at 1094 (footnote omitted) ("The [Supreme] Court has not
treated the rules of substantive interpretation of treaties, as opposed to their validity and effect on
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duty to honor the Senate's express reservations, declarations, and
understandings. In the final analysis, the emerging nationalist paradigm
in U.S. treaty interpretation does not rest on constitutional principle, but
rather on a naked policy preference favoring American exceptionalism
in foreign affairs. 257
Nationalist concerns about the Vienna Convention's determinacy
and democratic legitimacy remain unpersuasive because they ignore the
principles that govern courts' assimilation and application of
international norms. As discussed previously, Sabbatino suggests that
the Vienna Convention's domestic applicability depends upon three
factors: (1) whether a preponderance of states observe the relevant norm
out of a sense of legal obligation, (2) whether the norm has achieved
sufficient determinacy for principled application in domestic courts, and
(3) whether judicial internalization of the relevant norm will
"touch ... sharply on national nerves."258 This multi-factor balancing test
effectively screens out emerging norms that are not yet ripe for
domestic internalization. Yet this screening function is only half the
story: When emerging international norms satisfy the three prongs of
Sabbatino's sliding scale, they become binding principles of domestic
law, which U.S. courts must enforce.
By all accounts, the Vienna Convention's treaty interpretation
provisions easily satisfy Sabbatino 's three-part test. First, as
demonstrated in Part I, the Convention's authoritative status has gone
virtually unchallenged over the last quarter century. International,
foreign, and domestic courts routinely apply Articles 31-33 as
customary law when they interpret international agreements. Second,
the Vienna Convention's textual codification gives its interpretive
guidelines a sufficiently high degree of determinacy for principled
application by domestic courts. Third, the Convention's framework for

federal and state law, as a constitutional matter.").
257. In reality, courts' failure to internalize the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework
may reflect ignorance of the Convention's requirements. "For United States jurists," Bederrnan
has argued, "rules of treaty construction are truly judge-made law, and they remain largely
ignorant of international glosses on the subject. .. There appears to have been little appreciation of
substantive canons of treaty interpretation-default rules which favor particular interpretive
results or policy outcomes." BED ERMAN, supra note 78, at 244. See also Blackmun, supra note
113, at 8 ("Modem jurists ... are notably lacking in the diplomatic experience of early Justices
such as John Jay and John Marshall, who were familiar with the law of nations and felt
comfortable navigating by it. Today's jurists ... are relatively unfamiliar with interpreting
instruments of international law."). Even jurisdictions that claim to apply the Vienna
Convention's interpretive provisions frequently overlook or ignore the distinctions between the
Convention and the nationalist approach.
258. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964).

HeinOnline -- 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 493 2003-2004

494

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 44:2

treaty interpretation not only does not "touch ... sharply on national
nerves" but actually furthers American values and interests. The Vienna
Convention does not present a scenario in which courts seek to
internalize customary norms in defiance of the executive branch's
express or tacit disapproval, or even in the proverbial "twilight zone" of
executive silence. 259 Hence even when viewed from a nationalist
perspective, the judiciary's authority and responsibility to apply the
Vienna Convention would seem to be "at its maximum."260 The
Convention clearly has become "part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their detennination." 261
How should the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework inform
judicial practice in the United States today? The answer is simple
enough: U.S. courts should explicitly invoke the Vienna Convention
and construe individual treaty provisions according to the Convention's
interpretive framework. For purposes of illustration, let us return to the
point at which we began-the United States' controversial kidnapping
of Humberto Alvarez-Machain.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court's dispute over the U.S.Mexico Extradition Treaty's proper interpretation was largely a product
of the justices' inability to agree upon the relevant interpretive
principles. 262 Although both the majority and dissent apparently
259. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (describing the executive's authority to act in foreign affairs in the face of
congressional silence).
260. !d. at 635 (describing the executive's authority to act in foreign affairs "pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress"). See also Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J.
253, 267 (Dec. 20) ("It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations."); Hiram
E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26
TEX. INT'L L. J. 87, 122-24 (1991) (explaining that such unilateral declarations may aid in
crystallizing substantive international law and in clarifying states' international obligations). Even
judges who advocate a nationalist approach to treaty interpretation that focuses solely on the
United States' unilateral intent should nevertheless apply the Vienna Convention, since the
executive branch claims these interpretive principles as its own.
261. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
262. Given the Court's
failure to reach a strong consensus regarding the interpretive
principles applicable to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, it is not surprising that six justices
were hesitant to condemn the executive branch's actions:
That the Executive may wish to reinterpret the Treaty to allow for an action that the
Treaty in no way authorizes should not influence this Court's interpretation .... [B]ut it is
precisely at such moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty 'to
render judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given
understanding to ascertain and apply it.'
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accepted that the Extradition Treaty should be interpreted "in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms" and
consistent with the treaty's overarching "object and purpose," neither
seriously considered the Convention's instruction to construe treaties
"in good faith." 263 Informing this assessment of "good faith" is Article
31(3)(c)'s additional instruction, which enjoins courts to "take into
account ... [a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable to the
relations between the parties."264 Thus, a "good
faith" treaty
interpretation would account for "the general principle of international
law," discussed in Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, i.e., "that one
government may not 'exercise its police power in the territory of
another state. "'265 The Vienna Convention incorporates this "general
principle" into the Extradition Treaty by implication. 266
Of course, the Vienna Convention's interpretive framework does not
operate mechanically, eliminating the need for courts to exercise "good
faith" and sound judgment. Instead, the Vienna Convention's function is
primarily heuristic, channeling courts' reasoning toward a
circumscribed range of internationally acceptable treaty constructions.
This observation suggests two obvious limitations to the Convention
as an interpretive framework: First, as applied to many treaty
provisions, the Vienna Convention's internationalist canons may not
provide definitive criteria for selecting between competing
constructions of a treaty provision. Second, the Vienna Convention's
interpretive framework may not prevent courts from adopting specious,
self-serving interpretations in politically sensitive cases. These
limitations are not unique to the Vienna Convention; they are, as legal
realists have shown, endemic to the adjudicatory process generally.
Given these inherent limitations, what contribution can the Vienna
Convention make to U.S. treaty interpretation? In my view, the Vienna
Convention's superiority over nationalist common law canons does not
lie in its (in)ability to transcend the limits of legal reasoning; rather, the
Convention's value is four-fold: First, the Convention lends greater
coherence to U.S. treaty jurisprudence by narrowing the gap between
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686-87 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
263. Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 31(1).
264. !d. art. 31(3)(c).
265. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 668 (quoting Brief for Respondent 16).
266. Even without the Vienna Convention, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion admits the
possibility that an international norm applicable to treaty interpretation such as the doctrine of
specialty might deserve judicial deference. /d. at 659-60, 668-69. The Vienna Convention merely
expands the incorporation of implied terms to embrace relevant norms of customary international
law applicable between the treaty parties.
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courts' aspirational internationalist rhetoric and its de facto nationalist
methodology. Second, the Convention's canons mitigate states'
disproportionate influence in domestic treaty adjudication. Third, the
Convention's application enhances U.S. courts' international legitimacy.
Fourth, the Convention offers a framework for more effective dialogue
between domestic, foreign, and international tribunals in developing
transnational treaty regimes.
Coherence. As this article has demonstrated, tensions between the
United States' nationalist and internationalist approaches have
prevented courts from developing a coherent, consistent treaty
jurisprudence. On a doctrinal level, the Vienna Convention's uneasy
coexistence with nationalist common law canons sows confusion for
courts and litigants alike. By adopting the Vienna Convention as a
foundational text, courts may reverse this trend and bring their actual
methodology in closer alignment with their internationalist rhetoric. If
the United States' internationalist paradigm for treaty interpretation is to
be taken seriously, Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention cannot be
lightly dismissed.
Mitigating Statism. It is certainly no secret that international law has
shifted away from a state-centric paradigm to a more eclectic and
inclusive paradigm in which "persons," "peoples," and other
nongovernmental entities have become legitimate subjects of
international rights and duties. 267 NGOs, for example, play an
increasingly influential role in the drafting and negotiation of
international agreements. More important for present purposes,
numerous international agreements such as the Refugee Convention
have as their primary purpose the advancement of individual rights
rather than the promotion of strategic state interests.
The nationalist approach does not adequately reflect this paradigm
shift. As Haitian Centers Council demonstrates, the nationalist
approach's categorical deference to the executive branch and liberal
construction favoring state sovereignty may prejudice the interests of a
treaty's intended beneficiaries. Nationalist interpretations may also
work to the detriment of nongovernmental entities (e.g., corporations,
charitable organizations) that structure their relationships in reliance on
a treaty's international meaning. While the Vienna Convention may not
solve this problem entirely, its focus on objective indicia of party intent
and a treaty's "object and purpose" are clearly steps in the right
direction.
267. Ruth G. Teitel, Humanity 's Law: Rule ofLaw for the New Global Politics, 35
L.J. 355, 362-63 (2002).
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Legitimation. The Vienna Convention reminds courts that some
interpretive strategies, which may find wide acceptance in domestic
constitutional, statutory, or contract interpretation, are simply
inapplicable and unacceptable in the treaty context. The Convention
directs courts toward internationally accepted interpretive principles and
also away from nationalist strategies that would undermine their
decisions' legitimacy in the eyes of foreign treaty partners. This
approach reduces interstate frictions, increases public confidence in the
judiciary, and encourages prospective litigants to select U.S. courts as a
forum for resolving their treaty-related disputes.
The United States may be able to weather the political repercussions
that flow from nationalist interpretations of bilateral treaties. Aside from
high-profile cases such as Alvarez-Machain, municipal courts usually
may adopt nationalist interpretations of bilateral treaties without
significantly undercutting the United States' diplomatic influence or
disturbing international regulatory networks. However, when courts
apply nationalist treaty canons to multilateral treaties, the stakes are far
higher, since the United States must then take on the whole international
community. Nationalist treaty interpretations are particularly
indefensible in this context, because they contravene multilateral
treaties' core purpose-the promotion of transnational legal
uniformity.268
The United States has a compelling interest in cultivating a reputation
for honoring treaty partners ' reasonable interests and expectations.
When courts interpret treaties according to internationally accepted
criteria, they manifest their respect for foreign treaty partners' legitimate
expectations and interests. The internationalist approach naturally
increases the United States' soft power in international treaty
negotiations and enhances U.S. courts' credibility and influence with
foreign and international courts in the development of multilateral treaty
regimes. These potential benefits are imperiled when courts ignore
international treaty canons and interpret treaties according to nationalist
canons that enhance executive discretion at the expense of traditional
rule-of-law values.
Interjudicial Dialogue. The Convention's principles and structure
provide a universal legal grammar that may facilitate more effective
communication, cooperation, and decisional uniformity among domestic
courts and foreign and international tribunals. 269 Just as federal courts
268. See El AI Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 169 (describing "uniformity of rules" as the
"cardinal purpose" of multilateral conventions such as the Warsaw Convention).
269. Although "the opinions of [the United States'] sister signatories" are not formally
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enter the domain of "state law" when they apply state constitutional
provisions, U.S. courts enter international jurisprudential space when
they apply treaties. The Vienna Convention situates U.S. courts within a
global interpretive community, providing a gateway to this
community's expectations, values, and interests. Rather than excluding
cultural assumptions from the interpretive process, the Convention
draws upon and informs the global "cultural assumptions within which
both texts and contexts take shape for [municipal courts] situated"
within an international context and thereby mediates between treaty
parties' often radically dissimilar cultural assumptions. 270
As globalization increases the frequency and intensity of international
judicial exchange, the global "community of courts" has emerged as a
vibrant epistemic community capable of unprecedented cooperation in
international treaty law's progressive development. 271 Articles 31-33 of
the Vienna Convention help to bridge the "gulfs in language, culture,
and values that separate nations" 272 by providing a set of definitive
"conventions of description, argument, judgment, and persuasion" to
facilitate interjudicial dialogue. 273 Naturally, these rudimentary
interpretive guidelines cannot ensure perfect transnational coordination
in judicial treaty interpretation, but at very least they provide a starting
point for a more sophisticated, transnational treaty jurisprudence.
Whether the Vienna Convention achieves its full potential will depend,
in large measure, upon U.S. courts' active cooperation.

binding upon U.S. courts, these decisions-like executive treaty interpretations-are "entitled to
considerable weight." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (citation omitted); see also El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) (considering interpretations of
the Warsaw Convention by the British House of Lords, the Supreme Court of British Columbia,
the General Division of the Ontario Court, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Singapore
Court of Appeal).
270. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 300 {1989). For a study of
interpretive communities' function in municipal treaty interpretation, see Ian Johnstone, Treaty
Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. lNT'L L. 371 (1991).
Curiously, Johnstone does not consider the Vienna Convention's role in expressing and
constituting interpretive communities.
271. For scholarly commentary on the global "community of courts," see William W. BurkeWhite, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24
MICH. J. lNT'L L. 1 (2002) (describing the potential and limitations of this international
community of courts in the context of international criminal law), and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (2003) (exploring the dynamics of this
international judicial dialogue).
272. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 66 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
273. FISH, supra note 275, at 116.
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CONCLUSION

As the United States enters the twenty-first century, many of the most
hotly debated questions in domestic law involve the interpretation of
international agreements. Recent examples include the definition of
"unlawful combatants" under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War274 and the scope of foreign nationals'
right to consular assistance under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Consular Relations. 275 International agreements impact innumerable
other fields of domestic law as well, as the United States cooperates
with foreign nations to promote transnational legal order. To an
unprecedented degree, these bilateral and multilateral treaty regimes
have effected a profound internationalization in the source and content
ofU.S. law.
Given treaties' increasing importance as sources of domestic rights
and obligations, the United States' sovereign interests, and the interests
of individual U.S. citizens governed by these agreements, are ill-served
by a schizophrenic treaty jurisprudence that vacillates capriciously
between conflicting nationalist and internationalist paradigms.
Internationalist treaty canons are needed more desperately today than at
any other moment in American history to promote transparency,
stability, and predictability-in short, the ."rule of law"-in
transnational treaty litigation. The Vienna Convention moves U.S.
treaty jurisprudence in this direction by providing courts with
authoritative internationalist canons for treaty construction. These
canons are fully compatible with the United States' constitutional
commitments (subject, arguably, to Senate reservations, declarations,
and understandings) and clearly satisfy the Supreme Court's "sliding
scale" test for the judicial internalization of customary international law.
As a guide to international custom, the Vienna Convention's treaty
274. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6
U.S.T. 33!6, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See, e.g., AI Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that a detainee at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo had no right to habeas
corpus in U.S. courts); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a U.S.
citizen's apprehension in a combat zone in Afghanistan sufficed to justify his detainment as an
"enemy combatant"); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that
an American citizen who fought alongside Taliban soldiers in Afghanistan did not qualify for
lawful-combatant immunity). See generally George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, AI Qaeda, and the
Determination of Illegal Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002).
275. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. Ill (1999) (refusing
to grant a preliminary injunction to stay the execution of a German citizen who claimed a
violation of his rights under the Vienna Convention); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76
(1998) (asserting that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations allowed state law to
prescribe when a noncitizen's rights to consular access expire).
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canons furnish an invaluable framework for harmonizing U.S. treaty
jurisprudence with international law.
For over two centuries, U.S. courts have applied customary
international treaty canons in domestic treaty cases with the aspiration
to promote world public order. It would be an incalculable mistake to
abandon this internationalist paradigm now, just when internationalist
treaty canons are needed most.
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